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Introduction
Steve Gimbel
One of the most wonderful aspects of the
job of university professor is that one’s occupation is
based on an area of personal expertise that shapes
one’s Being. So it is with Richard C. “Dick” Richards,
who, amongst other areas of specialization, is a
philosopher of love. Richard’s Being is one deeply
entrenched in love. There is, of course, the romantic
love he long shared with his recently passed wife
Marty, but there is also the love of many, many
students and colleagues, both in and beyond the
department at California State Polytechnic University
at Pomona, and undeniably his love for poetry,
humor, and the philosophy to which he dedicated so
many years. Most of all, though, is (as cliché as this
sounds), his love of life. Few people so embody the
virtues they discuss, living so vitally and thereby
affecting the lives of so many who come in contact
with them, even briefly, that this love is shared by so
many. This volume is intended as a testament to
that love given and now redirected back toward
Richard C. Richards.
On the title page of my personal copy of his
book A Philosopher Looks at the Sense of Humor, is a
personal inscription in which he deems me his
“favorite Jew.” This is a sentiment I accept with the
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deepest honor. (I wish I could return it in the
converse, but I would risk alienating my wife and
while I love Richard…I don’t love him THAT much). It
is characteristic of his sense of humor: wry, sharp,
and unexpectedly edgy while delivered with a calm
sophistication. If one were to encounter a martini as
dry as his sense of humor, it would leave one
shaken, if not stirred to action trying to find how one
could mirror his subtle, effective delivery. Richard
contends that humor is the appreciation of
incongruity and his humor perfectly embodies it. He
is capable of delivering even the most crude remark
in a sufficiently erudite manner that you are left at
first wondering whether he really just said what your
ears heard. Those who know him, know full well
what he said, how he said it, and generally will need
help getting off the floor as a result.
That scholarly, cultured way of being is not
feigned for the sake of the joke. Dick is the
quintessential philosophy professor: possessing a
mastery of the history of human thought, committed
fully to rigor in discourse, open-minded in his
consideration of perspectives well-beyond the
expected, and playful with ideas both new and
old. He fully embodies the life of mind. In this way,
he stands as a model to those of us who later
embarked upon the path. He is the sort of authentic
intellectual who reinforces your own love of ideas
and wisdom because you can see without cynicism
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that such authenticity is, in fact, possible. He stands
as an instance of the final cause of the passion for
thought that led so many of us to start thinking
about these questions in the first place as naïve,
excited teenagers. We then see someone wellremoved from those early days, who has traveled
the road for decades and has retained the love of
that journey.
Richard loves philosophy and we love
philosophy. For this reason, we also love him. That
love is the reason for the following essays.
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Richard C. Richards, I Hardly Knew Ye
Peter Francev
I first met Richard Richards at California
State Polytechnic University, Pomona, in the fall of
1996. I was a Freshman who had a curious interest in
philosophy; yet, at the time, I was a Biology major
planning of a life in Hawaii where I’d be conducting
research on sharks while teaching at the University
of Hawaii and surfing before and after work. Little
did I know that my life would be changed forever,
after a chance meeting with Richard.
During the first week of the fall quarter, I
walked across campus from the biology labs and
headed over to the Philosophy Department offices; I
was planning on double-majoring and sought some
much needed advice. Richard was the only professor
in his office, so I nervously stopped and knocked on
his door. He called out to “Come in.” I did, not knowing what to expect. There, sitting before me, was a
rather lanky individual, whose face was buried in
some papers.
He quickly told me to sit down and asked
what he could do for me, stating that I didn’t look
familiar, asking which of his three classes I was in. I
told him that I wasn’t a student of his- yet- but that I
was a Bio major and was interested in doublemajoring. He told me that this was “Good. Good”,
and that Philosophy would be a fine second major,
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especially one where the analytical thinking skills
would complement the scientific ones that I would
surely be learning during the next four years.
He asked what my interests were in
philosophy and before I could answer, he followed
up with inquiring what philosophers I had read.
“Nietzsche and Camus.” He quipped that Nietzsche
was “alright” and Camus was a “good guy”. He said a
few other things, mainly about which classes to take,
including his own History of Philosophy sequence.
(Richard taught both, History of Ancient Philosophy,
History of Medieval Philosophy, Existentialism and
Philosophy of Love and Sex. And as an eighteen yearold, it was the last course that he mentioned that
had piqued my interest.) I knew that my previous
exposure to Nietzsche and Camus, which was merely
“recreational” reading that I had done on my own,
would require the course on Existentialism, and his
two history courses were core required classes.
Apparently, I was going to be seeing quite a bit of
this Richards fellow—and he’d be seeing a lot of me.
Philosophy 465: Philosophy of Love and Sex
Right. So here I was sitting in Richards’s
Love and Sex class, along with about 80 other students, most of whom were wearing sweatshirts with
the Greek letters of their fraternity or sorority sewn
on the front. At exactly 6:00pm, on the first Tuesday
of Spring Quarter 1997, Professor Richards walked

8

into our classroom (in one of the Engineering
buildings, for some reason), put down his books,
notes and syllabi down and announced the following
disclaimer to the class: “Good evening, ladies and
gentlemen. This is Philosophy 465: the Philosophy of
Love and Sex. I am your professor, Professor
Richards. This is not, let me repeat that: this is NOT a
course in which we are going to discuss the pleasure
of sex; we are not going to talk about why your
boyfriend can’t get you to orgasm; we are not going
to search for the “g-spot”, like Indiana Jones on
some quest. We are going to look at all types of
loves from a PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE. Period. If
you’re interested in any of the aforementioned
classes, please see Dr. So-and-so’s class on human
sexuality or Professor What’s his name’s class on the
psychology of relationships. Understand? Good.” At
that point, exactly 1/3 of the class stood up, grabbed
their things and walked out. He then turned to the
remaining students and went over the syllabus
BEFORE he took roll and dealt with the adds and
drops.
Hold on a second. What’s this? Look, look. It
says “PORNOGRAPHY” for Week #7. YES!! I knew it. I
knew that there was going to be some sort of porn in
this class. And then he discussed the unit on pornos.
We’d be watching a porno and discussing the merits
of the porn with the writer, director and star of the
flick. Wow. This was awesome; this really was a
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senior level philosophy class. And then, six weeks
later, at the end of week #6, Richards cued us in on
what to expect for next week’s lecture and
discussion: it was going to be…wait for it…wait for
it…a foot fetish porno. What. The. Hell. Is that!?!?
Well, dear reader, it is exactly what is appears to be:
a porno of feet. Feet walking. Feet running. Feet
jumping. Feet putting on shoes. Feet taking them off.
Socks covering feet. Socks seductively coming off.
Feet in red high heels. Feet in black pumps. Toes
“playing” with grapes. Toes “playing” with
earthworms. Feet, feet, everywhere and not the
slightest hint of moaning or groaning.
At the end of the class, I submitted a
research paper where I argued the merits of Romeo
and Juliet being in love and NOT in infatuation.
Richards totally disagreed. He pitched his arguments
during office hours; I pretended to listen and agree.
However, this was MY paper and I was going to write
it my way. And my way I did…and I received my lowest grade in any of Richards’s classes. I earned a “B”.
Philosophy 312 and 313: History of Ancient
Philosophy and History of Medieval Philosophy
The following year, I was fortunate enough
to take two more classes with Richard: Philosophy
312 and 313: History of Ancient Philosophy and
History of Medieval Philosophy, respectively. If I
remember correctly, I had one class on Mondays and
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Wednesdays and the other on Tuesdays and
Thursdays, which meant that I had four days of
Richard, his dry wit and the wealth of knowledge of
nearly 2,000 years of western philosophy. I
remember doing well in both classes; for History of
Ancient Philosophy, my end of term research paper
was a comparison of Plato and Aristotle on poetry.
When I handed him a rough draft for his
commentary, he merely quipped: “When it comes to
poetry and pretty much anything else, Plato is a
bastard.” From that moment onwards, I knew that
one of my undergraduate advisors was an
Aristotelean.
The History of Medieval Philosophy was a
bit more subdued. We covered the major figures,
using Frederick Copleston’s multivolume tome as the
foundation of our reading. It was during the
medieval class that I learned two important things
from Richard: first, despite all of the godliness, the
medievalists were an intellectually rich group of
thinkers; and second, luckily, the Arabs thinkers kept
Plato and Aristotle alive. He instilled in all of his
students that if it wasn’t for the Arab philosophers,
then the medieval period would really have been
“the dark ages”.
Philosophy 480: Existentialism
Existentialism was my baguette and butter.
Remember, back when I was a punk in high school, it
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was Nietzsche’s aphorism “God is dead.” and Albert
Camus’s novel The Stranger that ignited my interest
in both Existentialism and philosophy as a whole,
and now I was going to have my fourth class with
Richard. It was my junior year. We began the quarter
painstakingly looking at L. Nathan Oaklander’s
Introduction to Existentialism. We briefly looked at
Husserl as the Existentialists forefather, and spent
the bulk of the class looking at Kierkegaard,
Heidegger, Sartre, Beauvior, and Camus. While most
time was spent fairly evenly, I again learned two
more crucial things from Richard that have stayed
with me to this day: first, if Plato was a ‘bastard” by
Richards’s account, then Heidegger went above and
beyond Plato’s bastardness and was a “s.o.b.”
Secondly, and most important of all, Camus is a
fantastic philosopher. I learned the nuances of
Camusian philosophy and this is Richard’s enduring
legacy on me and my students. If it wasn’t for his
methodical and meticulous analysis of Camus, then I
would not have been motivated to attend graduate
school at University College Dublin, where I would
have written a Master’s thesis on Camus’s early
philosophy of the Absurd. If it wasn’t for Richard and
his appreciation and respect of Camus, then I would
not have gone on to co-found the Albert Camus
Society UK/US or the Journal of Camus Studies. And,
if that wasn’t enough, it was because of insistence
that Camus is a philosopher that I have been
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fortunate enough to expose my students to the
rigors of Camus’s philosophy.
Philosophy 499: Independent Study: Albert Camus
During my Senior year, as I was thinking of
grad school applications, I was drawn to UCD’s
strengths in Continental philosophy- not to mention
the fact that it was a student-oriented program (I
will explain this in detail, in a moment.)- I approached Richard about working with me on an independent study, where I could focus on Camus exclusively.
In hearing that I wanted to go to grad school in
Ireland and write my MA thesis on Camus, Richard
suggested that I look at Dostoevsky as an early
influence. (This would be key because a year later,
my MA thesis would have a chapter devoted to
Dostoevsky’s influence on Camus. That chapter
would stem from my research the previous year, in
the final class that I had with my mentor.) I read
Notes from Underground for the first time; I saw
immediate connections to Camus’s characters
Meursault and Clamence, from The Stranger and The
Fall respectively. Even today, when I teach Notes, I
still get goosebumps thinking back to my excitement
at what I thought was discovery while sitting in
Richard’s office.
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Post-BA Graduation
Following my graduation, I enrolled at
University College Dublin; one year later, I walked
out with a MA in (Continental) Philosophy. I taught
high school for a couple of years; turned down a PhD
program in Philosophy (scared of being $125,000+ in
debt by the time I finished and not having a tenure
track job.); went back to graduate school (MA in
English); and began a life of teaching at the
community college level (Currently, with one year
left before tenure and finishing a PhD in English.).
I am a product of Richard’s dedication to his
field and to his students. There isn’t a day that
doesn’t go by that I do not think of him, or what he
taught me, or how he showed me to always believe
in your students. He demonstrated to me that you
push your students, even when you don’t think they
can handle the pressure or the criticism, because
often times they will surprise you. He was a model
professor: he expected a lot from his students; he
pushed them to their limits, but he was always by
their sides encouraging them to never give up. He
taught me to care and be respectful of our students,
just as he was with me. It is his impact on my life
that allows me to impact the lives of students whom
I come into contact with every day. So, Richard, on
behalf of the countless number of students that had
the pleasure and honor to sit at your feet and learn
from your wisdom, I thank you for everything.
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Humor and the Good Life
Laurie Shrage
I don’t remember how it started, but
somehow throughout my career at Cal Poly Pomona,
Dick regularly asked me what colors I wanted. Then,
a few days later, he would leave a bag of bearded iris
rhizomes in our department office for me. Evidently,
Dick was obsessed with breeding these plants, and
his breeding program generated many “rejects,”
which he shared with his friends and colleagues. My
garden was full of his beautiful rejects, and I soon
learned to appreciate these plants, which I think was
Dick’s true aim.
Before I arrived at Cal Poly, Dick launched a
course on the Philosophy of Love and Sex. It was a
popular course so, when I was hired, Dick asked if I
would be interested in teaching some sections. I
agreed, and over many years, Dick and I shared
materials and ideas for this course. It’s hard to
imagine that Dick’s course could be taught in today’s
climate. For example, he would invite a filmmaker
who made “crush fetish” films to his class to discuss
the ethical issues involved. The films were often
disturbing to students, and thus students would
struggle both to understand the point of view of the
filmmaker and then to marshal all the moral theories
they had absorbed to argue against the activities
depicted in the films. Dick’s classroom discussions
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were lively, contentious, engaging, thoughtprovoking, entertaining, and memorable. Dick was
admirably respectful to both his guest and to his
students, and worked to ensure that many points of
view would be heard and assessed. He showed his
students how to have illuminating and productive
conversations among people with widely divergent
views. Occasionally a student might complain about
the topics or materials Dick shared, but fortunately
our department and university could be relied upon
to defend the principle of academic freedom.
I similarly had a few student complaints
when I included in my course (in the 1990s) such
topics as same-sex marriage or BDSM. Today I am
more cautious, as I have had students record
without permission parts of my courses, and these
recordings could easily be viewed out of context.
Also, I am less confident today that universities will
strongly defend a targeted faculty member’s
academic freedom, or protect faculty who are
responsibly teaching highly controversial topics.
Dick’s greatest contribution to our
department was his cultivation of humor. He often
pointed out the incongruities of our lofty pursuits at
Cal Poly Pomona surrounded by fields of horses and,
of course, horse shit. Cal Poly’s campus was situated
on an Arabian horse ranch donated by the Kellogg
cereal family, and we also had an Ag school, with
cows, chickens, and a swine unit. This was a great
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place to appreciate the “paradoxical, the illogical,
and in general the often surprising elements in
human existence.” For example, when teaching
about the scientific study of masturbation in my
Philosophy of Love and Sex course, it was heartening
to discover that corn flakes were actually invented
and manufactured by the physician John Kellogg to
suppress this supposedly awful vice. When Tony the
Tiger mascots would show up at our various campus
celebrations, these could be occasions to
contemplate the hidden meaning and power of corn
flakes.
Dick was especially attuned to the odd
similarities and contrasts between the selfimportant, enterprising humans who inhabited the
campus and the exploited, ruminating animals. His
casual observations about the ranch/farm setting of
our somewhat insane endeavor to lead the life of
the mind served to sharpen our appreciation of
incongruity. They also helped us reframe our
obsessions—with annoying students or powergrabbing administrators—and ultimately cope with
the unrelenting demands of the work place. I
vaguely remember him wishing we all had more
horse sense about our predicaments.
Although Dick began writing and publishing
about humor after he retired from Cal Poly, I think
some of his philosophical musings about humor
wore off on me. I began including a section in my

17

Philosophy of Love and Sex course on why sex is
often the subject of humor—is there something
inherently funny about sex? I would bring in
examples of sexual humor, and ask students to
analyze these in terms of the various theories of
humor, e.g., superiority, relief, incongruity, play, and
so on. It turned out to be one of the most fun and
engaging sections of the course—and my students
probably needed some relief from our investigations
of sexual assault, harassment, perversion, and so on.
In my course on feminist philosophy, I started
including a section on gender and humor: what
makes a joke sexist, why are there so few women
comedians (there are many more today), what is
feminist humor, and why are feminists charged with
being humorless? It was hard to find writings by
philosophers on these topics, and yet these
questions invite philosophical analysis.
I think Dick is right that appreciating humor
is a form of aesthetic understanding. If this is so,
then it would be good to expand our capacity for
recognizing the incongruous and surprising elements
around us. Perhaps, deepening such forms of
appreciation should be included at all levels of
instruction. When I read to my granddaughter, I’ve
become more aware of how children’s books contain
many incongruities and surprises, and part of the joy
of reading to children is to see if they recognize
which incongruities are “real” (in some sense) and
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which are not. We expose children to fantasy and
fiction in order, we think, to expand their
imaginations and creativity, but perhaps part of
what we’re doing is expanding their sense of humor.
As Dick notes, this is different from the ability to
laugh, and is more about the capacity to notice
weird and unexpected relationships among things.
Helping people develop their sense of humor is
probably a good way to help them live a good life, so
why don’t philosophers do more of this?
Whenever I see a bearded iris, especially a
dark purple one, I’m reminded of Dick. And then I my
mind usually turns to crush films or why corn flakes
are not just for breakfast…

19

Humor in the Zhouyi
Bradford Hatcher
Introduction
It was the 1969-1970 school year at Cal
Poly, Pomona, when I signed up to study some
philosophy under Dick Richards, on the advice of my
brother Byron. I was in the middle of a radical
renovation of my worldview at the time, having
dropped out of college. The rocket science major
didn’t work out, once I realized that all the jobs were
military, and the math major had suffered from an
epiphany while trying to differentiate inverse
hyperbolic trig functions on two hits of acid. I
needed to switch to some more primitive human
endeavors, where it wasn’t so very far to the
creative frontier. Both philosophy and psychology fit
that bill: those guys didn’t have a clue, except maybe
Nietzsche and Maslow. I wouldn’t find out about the
Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics until later.
Neuroscience wasn’t really invented yet.
Byron and I had lucked out big time in
public high school with a world-class teacher
(literally), who understood that education required
little more than lighting a fire and keeping it stoked.
Hunger to learn would never be a problem for either
of us. And I knew that Byron wouldn’t point me to a
lesser teacher. I would be serious about my new
studies, but that problem was getting chipped away
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slowly by Alan Watts and Asian studies. That’s where
Dick came in, a funny guy in a serious business. I
took logic and semantics the first semester, and
ethics the next. There was something about humor,
and the way Dick demonstrated it. I wish I’d kept
copies of his zany-ass quizzes. Anyway, that
approach of his gave me a huge missing piece to my
puzzle. I had always had a fondness for pranks, and
always enjoyed comedy, but this went a lot deeper
than that. For me it was the license to unbind
ourselves from any one perspective or frame of
reference, to go exploring outside the box, to put
unfamiliar things together, and to nest analogies. To
poke the world, to sound out the idols for that
hollow ring. It was the key I needed to cognitive
nimbleness, and was almost the same thing as play.
It was permission to be a polymath, an eclectic, and
an interdisciplinarian. It was permission to question
everything, and especially my own seriousness. I
didn’t have that overview before, and I remain
immensely grateful to Dick Richards for that gift. A
2015 cartoon by Hilary B. Price pictures a happy rat
walking atop the walls of a maze and wondering
“Why didn’t I think of this earlier?”
I picked the following essay because it
illustrates what can happen when we approach a
thing that’s always taken seriously with the suspicion
that it might have something to entertain a sense of
humor. The commentary is on the Zhouyi, or
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Changes of Zhou, the original part of the Book of
Changes, superficially a book of divination written
28-30 centuries ago, but which appears to also
contain a situational ethic or moral instruction for
the young of the noble class (Junzi, a word that
changed meaning with Confucius). The book was
used officially by the king and the nobles. Of the tens
of thousands of studies done on this book, from
hundreds of different points of view, I have never
encountered a one that acknowledged a layer of
humor in the subtext. But I saw stuff that I thought
was peeking through, even though humor had to
have plausible deniability at the royal court, since it
was primarily used to affirm important decisions in
affairs of state. I saw what I thought were hints and
puns, and plenty of irony and caricature, but I wasn’t
certain until I had taken a few years to learn ancient
Chinese and translate the book myself.
Humor in the Zhouyi
In 1997, when I first proposed
writing an article with this title, I wondered
what ideas others had already happened
upon and so I posted an inquiry on several
newsgroups in search of some favorite
examples. I was a little shocked to learn
that, while many long-time readers had had
several humorous coincidences and
encounters with the Yijing, very few saw any
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intentional humor buried in the text itself. A
few, particularly those belonging to
religiously Daoist, academic Modernist, and
the Twitching Captives schools, were quite
openly hostile to the idea.
Indeed, few systems of thought or
belief have acknowledged humor as a
special state of mind and made an honored
place for it in their doctrines. Only three of
the world’s ‘religions’ come to mind:
Daoism, Zen and Sufism. All three of these
seem to be deeply concerned with the
resolution of paradox, of which spontaneous
laughter, grinning, or weeping in good ways,
is often the consequence. Elsewhere, humor
seems to be more of a threat than a
promise. When Abraham was called to test
his faith in YHVH, he was asked to sacrifice
his son Isaac as proof. Care to guess what
the name Isaac meant when the story was
written? Laughter. The coexistence of belief
or conviction and humor is often the most
difficult paradox of all to resolve. Just ask
anyone who has followed their love of the
lighthearted lore of Zen into a Zen
monastery: this can be a bitter, cold shock,
at least until you can get the Roshi alone.
Humor was making its way into
Greek art and literature by the 5th century
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BCE, and it was fully at home there by the
time of Aristophanes. But humor had
appeared long before this, on cave walls and
in Egyptian hieroglyphics. It cannot be that
people did no chuckling yet. As to the China
of the Early Zhou, it may be argued that the
serious matters faced by the royal court
could not permit such foolishness, especially
where there were questions of war and
such. But doesn’t this call to mind the royal
courts of old Europe, where the court jester
or fool had the ability to make the king
laugh at just the right moment? And how
many lives might this have saved? There
would of course have been serious
constraints on the Zhouyi authors - it would
not be at all wise to offend or insult the king
or his court. The authors, even in jest, were
not pure fools - wherever such seeds were
to be planted, there would need to be a
little ambiguity, a lot of subtlety, some back
doors to escape through, and plenty of
plausible deniability. Otherwise the work
would face censorship whenever a king took
offense. As such, it’s always very easy to see
the serious side of even the funniest Zhouyi
line.
I need to call upon my personal
experience with the humor of shamans in
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their more ‘primitive’ versions of the
societal role of counselor or mental health
worker. These people have cracked me up
too often to ignore this. This proves nothing,
but it prepares me to accept humor as a
deliberately applied treatment, or a therapy.
The Sufis have mastered this as well, and
use it with a kind of surgical precision to
treat human ignorance (of the divine) as a
disease. The understanding of humor as
medicine has even gained wide acceptance
in professional circles, and claims of its
effectiveness is backed up by a statistically
significant number of statistical studies.
Humor will usually involve being jerked
suddenly out of a prior state of mind. In
anxiety or neurosis, it is the ’thing which we
do not understand’ which is obscured by our
life within these mindsets, expectations or
frames of reference as mental confines. In
subjects for divination, the ‘thing that I am
just not seeing’ will often demand nothing
more than a new mindset, expectation, or
frame of reference. This is humor’s home
turf. ‘Before you say something that might
offend another person, it is always a good
idea to first walk a mile in their shoes. That
way, if they take offense to what you say,
you are already a mile away. Plus you have
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their shoes.’ Much of humor, whether rude
and crude, or refined and witty, seems to
have two key ingredients: 1) a buildup of
something that might be called an
emotional charge, which is released
suddenly into nowhere; and 2) the
juxtaposition of two frames of reference
which are worlds apart, with the humoree’s
attention being jerked suddenly from one to
the other. Sometimes, however, it may
simply be the enjoyment of cognitive
dissonance.
The source of the emotional charge
that humor makes use of is often something
much less than noble: aggression,
apprehension, fear, xenophobia, racism,
sexism, revulsion at deformity, negative or
anti-sympathy, or other emotional
discomfort. The use of laughter, of course,
goes way back in primitive society in its use
as a corrective social force, as a precursor to
shame. You don’t see much of this malice in
the Yijing, but it may be that the frequency
of malice in humor in general is the source
of so much reluctance to perceive humor as
a device used by the Zhouyi authors. In
contrast, the emotional charge here, as it is
in the teaching stories of Daoism, Zen and
Sufism, seems to use more of the reader’s
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hope, expectation and anticipation, and to
rely heavily on the respect and reverence
that the tradition is accorded. The current
theories of humor, of which Arthur Koestler
is the best known author, suggest that the
process of humor involves emotion and
intellect traveling a while down the same
track or line of reasoning. The intellect is
then made to jump suddenly and
unexpectedly onto a different track, leaving
emotion, with its greater inertia or slower
response to change, derailed with nowhere
to go and nothing to do but go Blooey.
The frames of reference, lines of
reasoning, or tracks to jump, can come from
any two worlds which are unrelated and
have their own sets of internal logic,
assumptions, and rules. The two can be
literary vs literal (walk a mile in their shoes),
one meaning vs another meaning (take my
wife, please), general vs specific (that was
no lady, that was my wife), mental vs
physical, specialized vs common, sacred vs
secular, trivial vs exalted, conscious vs
automatic, part vs whole, mental vs
material, and so on. The simplest form, the
pun, plays on the homonym or polysemy,
the assignment of two different meanings to
the same word or sound. The Yi seems to
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have much of this - the limited number of
syllables and polysemous nature of the
Ancient Chinese language would, I suspect,
make this play irresistible. Much of this, of
course, would be lost to us, lost on us, and
even lost on the later Chinese scholars.
Some we can infer, like plays on Yi as
Change, Easy and an ancient place name.
And some seem to carry well between
Chinese and English because they are the
same puns in both languages and both
cultures.
The notion of cultural differences
brings up a much bigger problem. As
Koestler says, "Humor thrives only in its
native climate, embedded in its native logic;
when one does not know what to expect,
one cannot be cheated of one’s
expectations." In other words, if one of the
two juxtaposed frames of reference is
missing (or hard to reach, or poorly
understood) in the cultural repertoire of the
hearer, both sides of the joke are lost. You
could see how the mere existence of
cultural differences could be used to avoid
looking for humor altogether. Even the
Chinese people do not exactly live in the
Zhouyi’s native climate. But look at this
statement closer: only in its native climate.
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This is oversimplified and there is a much
broader spectrum here. In its narrowest
sense this points to the difficulty of a native
of rural Minnesota in "getting" a New
Yorker’s urban humor. A little broader might
be the difficulty that an American television
viewer has in laughing at a BBC comedy
special. Then there is my own most
embarrassing difficulty with understanding
sophisticated puns in Swahili. But there is
also a sense in which ‘native climate’ can
refer to the broader realms of human
experience, and I have already made my
prejudices known regarding this issue - that
technology and complex cultural advances
aside, we still have a great deal in common
with the Early Zhou Chinese as humming
beings living in humming societies with
more than a hundred millennia as a single
species in common. And in conjunction with
this, an argument can be made that the
Zhouyi authors were keeping their famously
keen cognitive abilities alert to the existence
of human universals. Assuming that they
were looking for common problems, this is
what they wanted to write about. With this
possibility, we should not be too quick to
assume that any or all Zhouyi humor would
necessarily be lost to our cultural
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differences.
It has been my admittedly
unreachable objective to discover the
intended meanings of the Zhouyi authors. I
have made no apologies or excuses for this,
and I will openly disagree with anyone who
claims that this should not even be
attempted simply because it is doomed to
failure. As a working hypothesis, and not a
theory in need of a proof, the value of the
idea can be judged by its conclusions as well
as by its premises. And one of these
conclusions is that the hypothesis might be
able to solve several long-standing and
otherwise intractable problems of
interpretation. An inability to even look for
humor may have left a number of lines
completely misunderstood and thus badly
translated for all these many centuries. I am,
of course, too close to the task to be the
judge of this, and so I submit the following
for your edification and amusement.
Below are several examples of
what I consider to be intended humor, but
somewhat buried by the Zhouyi authors in
what I’ve termed ‘layers of vertical
ambiguity.’ It has gradually become my
opinion that humorous devices such as
these, particularly irony, used to illustrate a
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situational ethics, and caricature or parody,
using images depicting people ‘unclear on
the concept,’ may be characteristic of as
much as a tenth of the Zhouyi text. Irony
and parody are the two most common
forms, but there are others, some specific to
the nature of the Zhouyi itself, which will be
discussed as they come up. All this is in
addition to the use of a still more frequent
‘simple light-heartedness.’ Even if some of
these nominations fall to more serious
scrutiny, I hope that enough survive to at
least open a discussion on the topic, to
which there seems to be a lot of resistance
from both believer and scholarly types. Two
translations are given for each line, one of
the popular versions and my own.
Admittedly mine seems to put a little spin
on the line translation to help to bring out
the subtle ideas, but a look at the Matrix
translation and the Glossary will show that I
have still not ventured very far at all from a
strictly literal translation. In fact, I have
tended to be more verbatim than the often
stuffier translations.
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01.4 - 或 躍在淵 ，无咎 。
* Leaping about on the brink of a chasm. He
is not at fault. (tr. Blofeld)
* Somehow to dance across the deep. With
no mistakes.
This one is more of an example of
simple lightheartedness than humor, and it
has a good reason for being so. It is
generally assumed that the subject is still
the young dragon, finally ready to make that
all-important rite of passage, the big
transition from aerodynamic theory to true
flight, wherein the insubstantial wind must
be grabbed, used for support, and climbed
upon. (Wind is from the hui gua or upper
Trigram in the zhi gua or resultant
hexagram). Well, you may be a young
dragon, but standing there on the edge of
that cliff for the first time, your mighty
knuckles are still really white. Just take hold
of the wind - yeah, right. While the very
Gravity of the situation must be fully
appreciated, it is also the thing that will kill
you. And so it is important to learn to
‘lighten up,’ giving up all but the most
necessary baggage. Lightening up could be
just the key, just the thing to do against
gravity. I think the line is similar in
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implication to this quote from David Lloyd
George: “Don’t be afraid to take a big step if
one is indicated. One cannot cross a chasm
in two small jumps.” Btw, this is translating
Yue4, with its feather radical, as a shamanic
feather dance, a rite of passage from one
world to another. But here is an example
where vertical ambiguity is necessary. At the
same time, another querent might be ready
to hear exactly the opposite: “Look down.
This is a serious jump. Rethink this whole
thing. Life or death. Nothing funny here.”
The authors, at least from my perspective,
appear light-hearted and playful much of
the time. They loved to look at things and
problems in novel ways, and they loved to
have fun with words and expressions. But I
want to concentrate here on lines which
bear more of the structural properties of
humor.
05.6 - 入于穴 ，有不速之客三人來 ，敬之
終吉 。
* The topmost line, divided, shows its
subject entered into the cavern. But there
are three guests coming, without being
urged, to his help. If he receive them
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respectfully, there will be good fortune in
the end. (tr. Legge)
* Entering into a pit. With no invitations
extended to visitors, three people arrive. To
attend to them will end in good fortune.
The authors use the term Xue2 (pit,
hole, cave) in several places the same way
we do, as (also) a predicament, or an
emotional state, or the dumps of despair,
and as a pun. The general idea of the Gua is
to maximize the meantime, to get ready for
less humdrum experience to arrive, and to
get worthy of its arrival. The opportunity to
have cleaned up one’s pit, one’s dump, has
now passed and now here come the guests.
One can still salvage some dignity here by
showing respect.
10.6 - 視履考祥 ，其旋元吉 。
* The sixth line, undivided, tells us to look at
the whole course that is trodden, and
examine the presage which that gives. If it
be complete and without failure, there will
be great good fortune. (tr. Legge)
* Studying the footsteps, examining the
omens. (If) these come full circle, supreme
good fortune.
You have just finished treading on
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the tiger’s tail. If you are still alive, this can
be taken as the primary measure of success.
Ghosts do not leave footprints. If your
footprints do not lead all the way back to
where you now stand, you must have had
bad luck somewhere. The omen is that you
have already succeeded. The natives of Fiji
have a tongue-in-cheek peasant omen
parallel: if you are walking through a
coconut grove and a coconut lands on your
head, this is an omen that you had very bad
luck.
13.5 - 同人 ，先號咷而後笑 。大師克相
遇。
* Men bound in fellowship first weep and
lament, but afterwards they laugh. After
great struggles they succeed in meeting. b)
That is, they are victorious. (tr. Wilhelm)
* Fellowship with others begins with wailing
(and) weeping. But then follows with
laughter. Mighty armies can entertain each
other. 13.5x Praising each others abilities.
I hope the translation explained
this one. There are other levels to meet on,
and the battlefields have better uses. The
wordplay relies on the broad range of
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meanings for Yu4 (7625), meet with,
encounter, receive, entertain, engage, etc.
to show that there are other options in real
life as well. Here is a fairly rare instance
where the Wing authors of the Xiao Xiang
‘got it’ as well.
15.1 - 謙謙君子 ，用涉大川 ，吉 。
* The first line, divided, shows us the
superior man who adds humility to humility.
Even the great stream may be crossed with
this, and there will be good fortune. (tr.
Legge)
* Authentic modesty in the noble young one
(is) useful (in) crossing great streams.
Promising.
This line illustrates the simple,
straightforward application of incongruity, a
device used many times in the Zhouyi. The
Gua Ming of Qian1, at least when it is
glossed as Modesty, is fraught with a
number of connotations which are
inconsistent with the ideas being set forth
here. Modesty can carry implications of
false humility and self-effacement, or
connote a toady or a sycophant. The Zhouyi
uses this device to dismantle these illusions.
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The very idea that modesty can be applied
to the achievement of great and ambitious
ends (and later, that modesty can even be
used to set an army in motion) sets up a
kind of tension which is broken only with
the understanding that something closer to
Honesty, Authenticity, or Maturity is being
portrayed here.
27.6 - 由頤 ，厲吉 ，利涉大川 。
* The source of nourishment. Awareness of
danger brings good fortune. It furthers one
to cross the great water. (tr. Wilhelm)
* (At) the source of the appetites. Brutal
(but) promising. Worthwhile to cross the
great stream.
For me this one calls up the image
of two missionaries sitting in a big old
cannibal cook pot. But in any event, this far
across the great water, the tables can turn
and predator can quickly become prey. The
food chain is actually a nutrient cycle. The
corresponding line in the zhi gua is the one
beyond hope of returning, which was
repeated in the West as Napoleon’s winter
march on Moscow.
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28.1 - 藉用白茅 ，无咎 。
* The first line, divided, shows one placing
mats of the white mao grass under things
set on the ground. There will be no error. (tr.
Legge)
* (For) cushions, using white thatch grass.
Make no mistakes.
This is an example of irony. While
precaution is called for here, and this
behavior shows what is ordinarily admired
as a civilized, aesthetic sense, what is
needed here and now is a heads-up brand
of caution. Elsewhere throughout the Gua
texts, the roof is about to come down.
These little woven white place mats are
seriously misplaced. The Zhouyi will
frequently trap someone who has moved on
to the Yao Ci texts but has already lost sight
of the theme of the Gua as a whole.
43.5 - 莧陸夬夬 ，中行无咎 。[中未光也 ]
* In dealing with weeds, firm resolution is
necessary. Walking in the middle remains
free of blame. b) The middle is not yet in the
light. (tr. Wilhelm)
* Wild greens (on) dry land. Determined to
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uproot. To balance the behavior is not a
mistake. 43.5x The center has not yet been
honored.
This is irony again. Our dedicated
gardener has too much force and not
enough sense. Not only is he destroying
salad greens as weeds, they are growing
voluntarily on a hill, where no plowing or
irrigation is necessary. Presumably he will
then replace them with something more
delicate, which needs more weeding, and
will require that water be run uphill to meet
its needs. This is not the world’s first
permaculturist here, and not the path of
least resistance. The character is
demonstrating the normally praiseworthy
virtue of persistence, but without this being
in balance (Zhong1), it is not a virtue yet.
44.3 - 臀无膚 ，其行次且 ，厲 ，无大咎 。
[行未牽也 ]
* His haunches have been flayed and he
walks totteringly – trouble, but no great
error! 44.3x His walking totteringly implies
being able to walk without being dragged.
(tr. Blofeld)
* A rump with no skin. His progress (is)
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second-rate now. Brutal. (But) not a
complete mistake. 44.3x Advancing (but)
now not being dragged.
The Gua text was right: the woman
was powerful. It was not at all useful to
court that woman. Apparently, little helmethead has been demonstrating poor
leadership skills for some time now. This
represents one of the forms of humor
specific to the Yi, preying upon the reader
who has lost sight of the theme of the
Hexagram as a whole, in this case Restraint.
However, ropes, chains and other kinds of
restraints may indeed have been involved.
But he has learned his lesson, and now he is
no longer bound, leashed, or tethered.
Maybe some sweet nurse ...
47.5 - 劓刖 ，困于赤紱 ，乃徐有說 ，利用
祭祀 。[受福也 ]
* His nose and feet are cut off. Oppression
at the hands of the man with the purple
knee bands. Joy comes softly. It furthers one
to make offerings and libations. b) Thus one
attains good fortune. (tr. Wilhelm)
* Nose cut off, feet cut off. Oppressed by
rouge-sashed (ministers). And then
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gradually finding relief. Worthwhile (and)
productive to sacrifice (this) sacrifice. 47.5x
To suffer happiness.
Our subject here is a noble or a
sovereign (line 5) with the ability to make
command decisions. But his life is being
moved by forces outside his control because
he is being so purely passive in all things. He
has adopted the victim mentality. Maybe
next time they bathe him they could use ice
water. This is an example of parody, satire or
caricature, and this device may be found in
every line of this particular Hexagram. The
Hexagram itself has being stuck in rut, a
mindset, an expectation, or a frame of
reference, as a good portion of its central
theme. Given this, it is not surprising that
the text attempts to get the reader outside
looking in, and poking some fun at the
victim’s approach to life.
50.3 - 鼎耳革 ，其行塞 ，雉膏不食 ，方雨
虧悔 ，終吉 。
* The third line, undivided, shows the
caldron with the places of its ears changed.
The progress of its subject is thus stopped.
The fat flesh of the pheasant which is in the
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caldron will not be eaten. But the (genial)
rain will come, and the grounds for
repentance will disappear. There will be
good fortune in the end. (tr. Legge)
* The cauldron’s ears [handles] (have been)
altered, its function (is) impaired. The
pheasant’s rich meat is not eaten. A sudden
rain (would) diminish regrets. In the end, an
opportunity.
This is parody, satire or caricature
again. This situation has been grossly
mishandled, and you can’t get a grip. Here
too is an example of common ideas crossing
cultural boundaries and used as images,
metaphors, and finally puns, in both
cultures. If the cauldron represents, let us
say, your philosophy of life, it lacks practical
application. The cauldron appears to have
been redesigned either by artists or by art
critics. The most you can do now is pray for
rain to put out the fire, to salvage what’s left
of the fat, juicy pheasant. And rethink the
relationship between form and function.
The Gua theme concerns pragmatism, the
application of reliable methods in the
cultivation of merit and a superior culture.
Empty ritual and show do violence to this
objective.
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53.4 - 鴻漸于木 ，或 得其桷 ，无咎 。
* The wild goose gradually draws near the
tree. Perhaps it will find a flat branch. No
blame. Wilhelm says: “A tree is not a
suitable place for a wild goose. But if it is
clever, it will find a flat branch on which it
can get a footing.” p. 207. (tr. Wilhelm)
* The wild goose advances by degrees to the
trees. Perchance to find that flat branch. No
harm done.
A similar image appears in the
Shijing at 1.10.8, with geese fighting for
balance in a Jujube tree, so this image was
apparently known to the culture as a whole
and may have been proverbial. Geese, of
course, have floppy webbed feet, not mighty
talons able grab hold of anything but mud
and water. The call here is for acceptance,
patience, and adaptability, but the image is
a caricature, or a Gary Larson cartoon. The
goose, if he fails, can always waddle around
on the hill, with a view almost as good as an
eagle’s.
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57.6 - 巽在床下 ，喪其資斧 ，貞凶 。
* Crawling below the bed. He loses what is
required for his traveling expenses.
Persistence brings misfortune. (Blofeld) [In
line two, a rabble of diviners and wizards are
used]
* Subtleties happening under the bed.
Losing some valuables (and) an axe.
Constancy has (its) pitfalls.
This happened only recently, down
in Line 2. Our subject has now been
comforted, and laid all doubts to rest. His
Wushi have assured him that this was only a
couple of spooks trying to wear him down.
But this time the ‘spooks’ are really there,
and run off with his money and his axe. The
symptoms are the same, but the disorder is
entirely different: different kind of spirits
this time, spiriting his stuff away. As Xun4
doubled, this is the ‘thinking twice’
Hexagram. Here of all places it is not wise to
generalize from single instances and go back
to sleep on your bed of complacency. Quick
generalizations are most ill-suited to the
shapeshifting world of the Gua Xun. Here
again is a line of the type which plays with
the tendency to lose sight of the subject
matter of the Gua as a whole, or to not
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relate one line to what is happening in the
others.
Excerpted from The Book of Changes: Yijing,
Word by Word, 2006, published free online
at www.hermetica.info
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Mongo Give Good E-Mail
Camille Atkinson
The first time I met Richard C. Richards
(whom I later learned was also known as Mongo) we
were at the 2013 LPS conference on the west coast
of Florida. He was wearing a T-shirt that said
something about having attended his own funeral,
so I figured that he, like me, had a penchant for
gallows humor. Later, during an author-meets-critics
session focusing on his at-the-time-new book (A
Philosopher Looks at The Sense of Humor), I was as
eager to learn more about his work as I was
delighted by the friendly banter between him and
the other attendees. Although this was the first time
I had been to this conference or met members of the
society, it was immediately clear that this was a man
who was both loved and respected. So, because I
was determined to get a piece of him myself, I
bought his book, read it, then reached out to him via
email. Thus began one of my most cherished online
relationships. Actually, that’s an easy hurdle to clear
as I don’t, as a rule, have online relationships and
consider the term itself a bit oxymoronic. No, we
didn’t become “FaceSpace” friends or start “sexting”
one another—in fact, I suspect that he would be as
uninterested as I am in such 21st century
distractions. Of course, I can only speak for myself,
but I hope it will suffice to say that I avoid social
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media as much as I do angry fire ants or artisanal
pizza, and not necessarily in that order.
Because I enjoyed him and our exchanges
so much, I kept finding excuses to keep the
conversation going. I also wanted to pay tribute to
his work somehow—or, at least, the one book of his
that I’d thoroughly read and carefully annotated—
because I found it fun, funny, and important. So,
with his permission, I wrote an online review. What
follows are some excerpts from longer dialogues
using our pseudonyms—“Mongo” and “Daughter of
One-Lung-Low” or, for brevity’s sake, “DOOLL.” I’m
not sure how he became Mongo but suspect it had
something to do with the Mel Brooks film, “Blazing
Saddles.” As for my moniker, Mongo gets credit for
coining it after I’d shared the silly, self-deprecating
joke my Chinese-Russian father told his doctor when
informed that he and his lungs were working at less
than 75% capacity—specifically, he asked her to
refer to him by his “Chinese name of One-LungLow.”
I hope this provides enough context to
appreciate the following exchange and, no, I haven’t
bothered to clean-up any grammar, spelling,
punctuation, and so forth. Moreover, it most
certainly will not be in APA, MLA, CIA, LSD, or any
other proper academic style and format.
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Me: Hi "Mongo"!
Mongo: Hi, Daughter of One Lung Low.
I’ll cut into your email and make some comments at
the end if I haven’t covered it all.
First off, your review of the book is a delight. You
have indeed captured my thinking, emphasizing
some points better than I did. Thanks you. And your
own reactions are clear and cogent. I am delighted
to have such a fine reviewer.
DOOLL: OK, my turn to cut in...It's kinda like dancing,
huh?!
Mongo: Certainly not a sword fight.
DOOLL: Oh good! I was hoping I didn't blow it
somehow—it was fun for me, but I'd hate to have
disappointed you.
The [job] interview process of the last, ugh! TWO
years has been horribly frustrating—I seem to be
suffering from something analogous to the "always a
bridesmaid, never a bride" type problem. However,
this year seems more promising so keep your
fingers, toes, etc. crossed for me!

48

Mongo: Even my eyes will be crossed.
DOOLL: In the meantime, I have a humor question
for you and would like you to help me make sense of
the following experience: I was in line at the grocery
store today and noticed a huge, red mess on the
floor nearby. I said, "Geez, that looks like a crime
scene!" Of course, it wasn't but I wasn't sure what it
was and, fortunately, the man who dropped it
laughed and said, "Yeah, what a waste of a good
Merlot, huh?" One of the cashiers laughed too but
then quickly covered his mouth because all of the
other folks within earshot were wearing expressions
of disapproval. Now, I've been in Bend long enough
not to care what folks think of me but I'm always
wondering about differences in what counts as
funny and/or humorous. So, you tell me, did my quip
count as humor? If so, where was the incongruity? If
not, would you say it was merely a case of "funnyha-ha" that only two of us (plus my husband)
laughed at??
Mongo: Damn. A real-life example to test a theory.
So the theory is internally fairly consistent. Now it
has to apply and explain? I suspect your reaction
was humor. The inconsistency would be the
different and clashing explanations of the liquid on
the floor.
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DOOLL: OK, so here's one more question I have
regarding the incongruity condition for humor...Can
there be different interpretations for what counts as
incongruous? For example, I thought I was pointing
out a different incongruity—namely, that it would be
rather unexpected or surprising to find a "crime
scene" at a supermarket check stand. Then again,
depending on what markets one shops at…maybe
not??
Mongo: Incongruity is a function of the mindset.
How is that for obscurity? It is a function of what a
person expects, what “fits” into that, and what
doesn’t. But the important part is the state of mind
of the individual. Someone distracted or anxious will
probably not be able to play with the incongruity she
notices. Of course two people can see the same
thing, and only one sees something that does not fit.
One man’s incongruity is another man’s ordinary
world.
DOOLL: I suspect that this might explain, at least
partly, why my attempts at humor fail around here
more often than not. Not only do many people seem
unaware of the incongruous, much less how fun it
can be to play with them, they don't even seem to
notice inconsistencies. All I know is, teaching logic or
critical thinking at COCC was WAY harder than I
could ever have imagined. This is because a large
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number of students failed to understand what a
contradiction was, let alone care about it! This also
explains why they cut my position, cancelled all
philosophy classes for over a year and now offer only
two per term.
Mongo: What a weird decision. I have always had
an intrinsic suspicion of administrators.
The merlot dropper may have been laughing from
nervous energy, or maybe he too saw and
appreciated the inconsistency. Same with the clerk.
Sometimes you can’t be sure of what other people
are laughing at, and why, so you just use the WAG
system (Wild-Assed Guess.) The inconsistency was
not strong, the laughs were hard to interpret, and
overall it is hard to tell for sure.
DOOLL: Yeah, that's the problem, isn't it?? Meaning,
we can only see others' external behavior (laughter,
pained expression, etc.), so it's virtually impossible
to know the cause or causes of it. Even when it
comes to understanding my own motives, I can't
always tell or there's more than one explanation for
why I did what I did. This is also the problem with
psychological surveys that ask folks about their
intentions, motives and so forth which is why I don't
put much stock in them. The surveys which ask
couples about sex and cheating really get me—
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mainly because I think we humans are pretty good at
lying, even to (or especially to) ourselves…
Mongo: I think it was Nietzsche who said: I will not
lie, not even to myself. Pretty hard to keep that
commitment.
In sum, we carried on like this for months,
also sharing personal stories about our families,
children or the lack thereof, etc. What I don’t believe
Mongo knew was how painful my life was at the
time. Not only was I in a chaotic mess-of-a-marriage,
I was living in rural Oregon.
When I told one of my urban-dwelling
uncles that I’d landed there, he quipped, “Geez, you
could have been kidnapped to a better place!” In
other words, it was an unfamiliar place where I felt
unusually alone and isolated—despite being married
or, perhaps, because of it—and having never really
dealt with the untimely deaths of my parents. I
mention this only to underscore how grateful I am
for Mongo’s substantive and regular email attention.
His wisdom and generosity suggested a sense of
community, however abstract, and his unrelenting
sense of humor provided a delicious relief from
those moments of despair. On a more rational and
practical level, the exchange of ideas gave me the
intellectual stimulation that I would not have had
otherwise, and his work inspired me to get some
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research, writing, and publishing done. For that, I
remain forever in his debt. So, if he ever needs a
kidney, there’s lien on one of mine with his name on
it.
I will close this tribute with a quote from
Carrie Fisher—another brilliantly funny person who,
sadly, is no longer sharing jokes with or among the
living. In an interview shortly before she shuffled-off
those mortal coils, she defended her penchant for
self-deprecating and irreverent humor. Saying
something to the effect of, “It creates community
when you share private, embarrassing things and
can find other people who share those things.” This
is exactly the kind of kinship I experienced in my
Mongo-encounters. It’s also why I remember Richard
C. Richards so fondly and with such sheer delight.
And, I will continue to do so for as long as I remain a
part of this world. For all I know he may outlive me.
If so, I hope he will recall me with equal fondness as
more DOOLL than fool.

53

Aesthetics, Humor, and Virtue: Reflections on
Richards and the Good Life
Elizabeth Victor
Introduction
In A Philosopher Looks at the Sense of
Humor, Richard C. Richards discusses how one's
appreciation of and ability to create incongruities is a
necessary condition for developing a sense of
humor. One's sense of humor, according to Richards,
can be a component of happiness. In this paper, I will
build on Richards's concept of the sense of humor. I
will argue that Richards account is consistent with an
Aristotelian picture of happiness as holistic wellbeing. Specifically, I will suggest that the attitude
underlying the aesthetic and/or the humorous is a
kind of pro-attitude that must be cultivated (i.e., one
is not simply born with a developed sense of humor).
I argue that a sense of humor, as an Aristotelian
virtue, is consistent with Richards’s developmental
account of a sense of humor. However, I am making
a stronger claim than Richards; I will argue that the
sense of humor is necessary for happiness. In this
way, I am filling out Richards’s account of the role
one's sense of humor plays in one's long-term
happiness. Since a good Aristotelian will offer
examples to elucidate the intermediate position
between the extremes, I offer an analysis of Richards
own writings and behavior as exemplifying an
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excellent sense of humor, one that has served as a
model for others to emulate the kind of play
necessary to "transform a simple incongruity into
the stuff of humor".
Richards’ Theory of The Sense of Humor
In Chapter five of his book, Richards tells us
that a sense of humor is a “kind of aesthetic
experience” that is a playful engagement with
incongruities. He explains, “[s]ince humor is a
response to the incongruous, the sense of humor is
the mental capacity…to playfully discover or create
unexpected and surprising combinations of
elements” (Richards 2013, 71). He employs a
developmental account to explain how one goes
about training up a sense of humor, telling the
reader that attitudes (a sense of humor being one of
them) are “a set of habits with which we approach
life.” Said habits are learned early, Richards tells us,
including one’s sense of humor. We can see
evidence for this in the way that children play with
incongruities—trying on a sense of humor when they
first learn how to tell a knock-knock joke. I was
recently around some small children, and they were
tickled pink by the silliness of the incongruities
within these kinds of jokes. Here are a couple of
choice knock-knock jokes:
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Knock, knock!
Who’s there?
Cow Says!
Cow Says who?
No silly, cow says ‘moo’ not ‘who’
Knock, knock!
Who’s there?
Boo!
Boo who?
Oh don’t cry, it’s just a joke
These sorts of jokes capture what Richards
calls “the sense of the funny.” We might think of the
sense of the funny as a nascent sense of humor. As
Richards indicates, “[t]o become the sense of humor,
the sense of the funny must become habitual… [a]n
attitude involving the development of appreciation
of incongruities must occur” (ibid, 77). From the
habitual “play” with a sense of the funny, we
develop a sense of humor through the cultivation of
the aesthetic appreciation of incongruities (ibid, 7778).
This cultivation of an aesthetic attitude or
stance toward incongruities is what gives the sense
of humor value, over and above a cheap thrill or
temporary amusement. Beyond eliciting “happy
laughter” from others, a sense of humor allows us to
face the difficult fact that we’re all going to die, and
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everyone we know will die, and life is likely
meaningless. The cultivation of the sense of humor,
as a form of art, gives us power over the fact that
we’re mere mortals, and that is something that gives
humor value above and beyond the instrumental use
of humor in, the classroom, or the hospital…or the
bedroom. This stance or pro-attitude that underlies
the sense of humor directly contributes to a person’s
well-being.
Yet, even as Richards maintains that a sense
of humor has a role in happiness, he seems to stop
just short of claiming that a sense of humor is
necessary for a person to be happy. A person might,
for instance, develop other coping mechanisms to
help him through life’s rough patches, building a
fulfilling life without having acquired a sense of
humor. However, he hedges this claim in the very
next paragraph as he states, “I think a person can be
happy without having or experiencing joy and
delight, but it would be a rare person who could do
this…a sense of humor is in almost all cases
necessary for a happy life” (ibid, 114-15).
Richard and Aristotle Walk into a Bar (and they both
say ouch!)
On my interpretation, it seems that
Richards is suggesting that the attitude underlying
the aesthetic and/or the humorous is a kind of proattitude that must be cultivated (i.e., one is not
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simply born with a developed sense of humor). In
this next section, I argue that a sense of humor, as
an Aristotelian virtue, is consistent with Richards
developmental account of a sense of humor, but I
don’t think Richards goes far enough. In building on
Richards arguments, I will make the further claim
that the sense of humor is necessary for happiness.
Aristotle on Humor
Some might argue that what Aristotle
considered wit was quite narrow, maybe too narrow
to capture the range of funny stuff Richards
discusses. Aristotle goes so far as to hint that some
kinds of joking ought to be outlawed. Specifically, he
states, “since a joke is a type of abuse, and
legislators prohibit some types of abuse, [the
legislators] would presumably be right to prohibit
some types of jokes” (Aristotle 1999, 66). John
Morreal, for instance, interprets this passage as
evidence that “though Aristotle considered wit a
valuable part of conversation (Nicomachean Ethics 4,
8), he agreed with Plato that laughter expresses
scorn.” (Morreal 2016). What is clear is that Aristotle
presents wit as one of the virtues and he discusses
humor in Rhetoric.
In Book II, Chapter 8, section 13 of the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle first presents us with
the virtue of wit. He describes wit as the
intermediate position between buffoonery and
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boorishness (Aristotle 1999, 26). In a more detailed
explanation of the virtue of wit, in Book Book IV,
Chapter 8, Aristotle states that wit is a matter of
character as he says, “[t]hose who go to excess in
raising laughs seem to be vulgar buffoons…[t]hose
who would never say anything themselves to raise a
laugh, and even object when other people do it,
seem to be boorish and stiff. Those who joke in
appropriate ways are called agile-witted. For these
sorts of jokes seem to be movements of someone’s
character…” (ibid, 65, my emphasis). Aristotle
cautions that we must be discriminate in our use of
humor, being sure to pay attention to context and
our audience, as he says that if humor is to
contribute to relaxation and amusement, one must
“…say and listen to the right things and in the right
way. The company we are in when we speak or listen
also makes a difference” (ibid.). In this way, the wit,
as a virtue, is like many other virtues, we must be
trained up through practice and wise counsel.
Aristotle is short on the details of how we
go about training up the virtue of wit, but he does
give us an account of humor that is similar to the
incongruity theory Richards depends upon. In
Rhetoric (III, 2), Aristotle presents us with something
akin to the incongruity theory of humor. He states,
“[t]he effect is produced even by jokes depending
upon changes of the letters of a word; this too is a
surprise. You find this in verse as well as in prose.
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The word which comes is not what the hearer
imagined.” (Aristotle 1941) For Aristotle, the
laughter expressed comes from the incongruity
between the joke and the facts of the world. When
taken in combination with his explanation of wit in
the Nicomachean Ethics, it makes sense why one
would need to know his audience. Incongruities
change, depending upon context and audience
education level, gender, life experiences, etc. For
instance, if I’m at a party with a bunch of MDs, I
might use the pun “Conjunctivitis.com — that’s a site
for sore eyes”, but this joke would fall flat with my
siblings. If I’m in a room full of philosophers, I might
say “Zeno walks half way into a bar…”, but again, this
joke would fall flat with just about everyone in my
family. Knowing the audience is crucial to the apt
exercise of wit.
The Role of Wit in Happiness (Eudemonia)
The link between joking and pain, when
taken in conjunction with Aristotle’s stress that wit
be expressed in the right place, at the right time,
gives us insight into how wit is tied to happiness. The
cultivation of an attitude to see incongruities, and
play on incongruities that appear in our lives can, as
Richards indicates, act as a coping mechanism.
Developing a means to alleviate the tension or face
our own mortality (or the mortality of those we
love), will certainly help us cultivate virtue in other
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areas of our lives. Indeed, if we fail to cultivate an
appreciation of incongruities, we may be deficient in
other facets of our moral lives. Being deficient in one
area of our character may erode other facets of our
character as well. For instance, if we never really
“get” a joke or appreciate a double entendre, this
might undermine our friendships, incite anger when
we don’t get that something is said in jest, or act as a
barrier to being pleasant (can you imagine how
frustrating it might be to not get a joke; being a
person that only laughs for social cohesion?). In
addition, I find it hard to imagine, as Richards
implies, what other coping mechanisms might
function as a sense of humor does. For instance,
exercise is certainly good stress relief, or so they tell
me, and it may help reduce my rage, but does it
really help others reduce stress or face the hardships
of life?
There is an inherent social dimension to a
sense of humor that is other-oriented, connecting to
the sense of political that Aristotle tells us is part of
our essence. Other coping mechanisms seem to
differ insofar as they are self-centered. No doubt,
humor and laughter can be self-centered, but it need
not be. Moreover, the virtue of wit and the sense of
humor, as described by Richards, is responsive to
one’s environment; in a word, responsive to others
in a way that restores our humanity and recognizes
the humanity in others. It is this dimension of the
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sense of humor—the fact that it calls us to attend to
the environment around us and others that makes it
an essential element of well-being. Of course, to
develop a sense of humor, like any virtue, requires
that we have role models to help us cultivate wit.
Developing ‘The Sense of the Funny’ into ‘The Sense
of Humor’
Moral education is an essential aspect of
developing virtuous habits, and Aristotle stresses the
importance of role models for us to emulate. Toward
that end, I propose that Richard C. Richards be
considered a role model for exercising wit,
particularly within professional academic
philosophy. I offer three examples to help illustrate
my point:
Autobiography of Richard C. Richards (on
amazon.com)
Now that I’ve gone through all of the dry
material—let me get to the good stuff! If there ever
was evidence that Richards is a man of wit, let me
submit, for your consideration, his autobiography
that he posted on his Amazon.com profile. I
stumbled upon this beauty while I was getting a free
copy of his book from kindle:
I remember little of my conception and
birth. I assume it took place, but I was not in a
position to appreciate it. It was all just a whirl of
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chromosomes and genes. Plus a rude exit into the
world at Moscow, Idaho. They tell me it was in 1935.
They could be wrong. I had what was, compared
with children today, an idyllic youth, spent in an
atmosphere of no TV and other digital devices,
mostly because they had not been invented yet. We
roamed the fields and woods near Boise, Idaho,
fished, and threw rocks at Neanderthals, who were
plentiful at the time.
A move to Santa Barbara, California, after
the late, great WWII introduced me to the world of
thinking, stimulated and occasionally threatened by
some really great teachers at both Santa Barbara
High School and the University of California, Santa
Barbara. At the latter I discovered my true vocation,
but became a philosopher instead. UCLA put the cap
on my bottle of education, and I spent nearly forty
years teaching at California State Polytechnic on a
one-year temporary appointment. I got all the
mileage out of that appointment I could.
My first marriage produced one son,
Randal, who produced nine grandchildren, who
produced four great grandchildren so far. A
wonderful marriage to Marlene "Marty" Richards
has added immeasurably to my life. The philosophy
of humor has interested me for years, and with
retirement, I decided to write the book, A
Philosopher Looks at The Sense of Humor. It has a
serious intent and a humorous approach. That way I
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can offend a larger number of people: both the
humorous and the serious. My funeral occurred
several years ago, but it did not take. But I got to put
the fun back in FUNeral. (Richards n.d.)
You can’t make this shit up—and yet he
does! It’s glorious—funny, punny, loaded with
examples of incongruities that you have to both
laugh at and appreciate.
Putting the Fun in Funeral
This next anecdote serves as further
evidence of Richards’s wit—it’s not just something
he crafts in writing, but something he has cultivated
through action. Some of you may be wondering
what it means to put the “fun back in FUNeral”;
allow me to elaborate. Now I don’t know all the
details, but as legend has it, some number of years
ago, Richard C. Richards actually faked his own death
and arranged his own funeral. At said funeral, he
greeted people with t-shirts that actually said
“putting the fun back in FUN-eral”! Could you
imagine?
Speaking of funerals—I think Jerry Seinfeld
said it best, “According to most studies, people's
number one fear is public speaking. Number two is
death. Death is number two. Does that sound right?
This means to the average person, if you go to a
funeral, you're better off in the casket than doing
the eulogy.” This is actually true—several surveys
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ranking people’s fears have confirmed that people
actually fear speaking more than death (Croston
2011). Unless you’re Richard, then you speak at your
own funeral!
Author-meets-Critics Sessions
For Richards, the sense of humor is not
something to be checked at the door of academic
philosophy. If anything, that’s where the
incongruities shine the brightest. As some of you
may know, Richards has been a regular contributor
to the Lighthearted Philosophers’ Society annual
conference, both as a presenting author and as a
heckler. He has really has been one of the
foundational figures and has had a heavy hand in
shaping this organization, shoring us up when we
just started to ensure we could continue
philosophizing over the good, bad, and ugly jokes for
years to come. These are some of the many reasons
why we honor him with the Richard C. Richards
almost memorial prize. That’s right—that prize
money is, well, I wouldn’t call it sugar-daddy money,
Splenda-daddy money—that’s what it is!
One of the most memorable
“presentations” involving Richards was the AuthorMeets-Critics session on his book A Philosopher
Looks At The Sense of Humor. Turning the traditional
APA-style panel on its head, Richards was joined by
three hecklers: Tom Brommage, Steve Gimbel, and
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Eugene Zaldivar. Instead of the stuffy, traditional
panel, the author met with heckles and jeers, for a
lively roast of the book. Chock-full of dick jokes, rips
on Richard’s age, and good old-fashioned jabs, the
hecklers incorporated a good amount of
philosophical analysis into their bit. As a member of
the audience, it was fascinating to watch and really
set the example of what this organization is about:
doing serious work, all the while not taking yourself
(or your work) too seriously. I don’t want you to take
my word for it, though, so I’ve garnered some
additional evidence from one of the hecklers—
Eugene Zaldivar.
Zaldivar was kind enough to offer additional
evidence from this author-meets-critics session. In a
recent correspondence, he told me of some choice
quotes that Richards asked to use for promotional
materials (on the book’s website or the book jacket).
What, pray tell, were these words of high praise?
Zaldivar said, “I'd like to start by admitting that I
found this to be a really nice book. It has all of the
hallmarks of a classic. It's printed on paper. It has a
lemur on the cover. It's written by a human with a
sense of humor. Yup, a really nice book. Richard
notes that one can disgust by using humor. Reading
this book is proof that this is true.” Richards was sure
to carefully couch his request, noting, “[m]y editor
may come up with some other dastardly way to use
the quotes, with, of course, proper citation of
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academic affiliation, thereby all but guaranteeing
that you will be fired and disgraced as a philosopher
and as a person. It would be a favor to me if you
would agree to any part of the above requests. If
not, I respect your good judgment” (Victor 2018).
Zaldivar kindly agreed, noting that he didn’t want to
appear unkind with the “disgust” bit. He shared this
with me for two reasons; as he explained, “[f]irst, it
shows his humility and sense of humor. In picking
two quotes that are clearly meant to be digs at his
expense he shows that he doesn't take himself too
seriously and that he can appreciate humor even
when he's the butt of the joke. In addition, the fact
that I trusted his instincts shows the respect I have
for him. I can think of many other people who I'd be
less willing to entrust with material that is less than
well-mannered” (ibid.).
The second anecdote, Zaldivar offers is from
last year's panel on Steve Gimbel's book, where he
read Richards’s review:
The first major criticism is that trying to
understand humor through comedy is a gigantic,
super-colossal mistake. Comedy is a performance
art. Humor involves the sense of humor in a
wonderful way. Approaching humor through the
mid-wifery of comedy leaves important insights
unaccounted for. Those insights include the role of
the sense of humor in the creation of comedy, and in
the enhancement of human existence. Minor
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considerations, of course, but monumental
nonetheless…With a remarkable grasp of the field of
the Philosophy of Humor, Steven has introduced a
productive new perspective into the philosophical
brew from which the dove of acceptance of the
Philosophy of Humor is now emerging. His
background as a stand-up comedian gives us all fresh
insights into older problems and brings up a few new
ones in addition (ibid.).
As Zaldivar explains, “[i]n the first line
Richard gives a fairly strong critique (he clearly
disagrees with Steve!) but does so with humor and
self-deprecation in order to take some of the sting
out of the criticism. In the hands of a lesser person
this could have been a very contentious point. And
then he adds some very nice comments about Steve
and the book at the end” (ibid.). These examples are
meant to illustrate how Richards has served as a
model of incorporating humor into academic
settings. As Zaldivar interprets them, these kinds of
examples “demonstrate a kindness of spirit, sense of
humor and sharp understanding of the material that
are individually in short supply and almost unheard
in aggregate” (ibid.). Until the Lighthearted
Philosophers’ Society, I had thought seriously about
humor, but I had never seriously exercised wit, and I
definitely didn’t have a sense of humor about
academic philosophy. For me, developing a sense of
humor has been essential to my well-being when
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navigating the bullshit that is the academic market,
overcoming flagrant instances of sexism and
misogyny (in general and at academic conferences in
particular), and the shit show that is “making it” in
this profession. How to do this, and how to do it
well, is something that I’m learning from Richard,
and others who emulate him. Lest this be a big kissass session, I’ll end by saying that I hope to hear
more about how Richards regards the limits of the
sense of humor, and how one could be happy or
have a fulfilling life without a sense of humor.
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Richard Richards, Robert Roberts, and Aristotelian
Aristotelianism
Steve Gimbel
This paper is a tribute to a philosopher and
a person I have long admired, Richard C. Richards.
As a clear and rigorous thinker, a thoughtful and
accessible writer, and as a kind, blunt, and extremely
funny person, Richard embodies virtues I hope to
someday claim as well.
It is, I believe, fitting, to begin this tribute to
Richard by considering the philosophical work of
someone else entirely. Richard has a well-developed
sense of humor, something he defines as the
attitude to properly appreciate incongruities, and
the idea of honoring one person by discussing the
work of another is surely the sort of incongruity he
has the attitude to appreciate.
The other philosopher I want to begin
discussing in order to honor Richard C. Richards is
another prominent name in the philosophy of
humor, Robert C. Roberts. Roberts is emeritus from
Wheaton College, that is, the Wheaton College in
Illinois, not the Wheaton College in Massachusetts.
(I want to be perfectly clear that we are talking
about Robert Roberts from Wheaton, not Robert
Roberts from Wheaton.) Richard Richards and
Robert Roberts, we will see, are similar in that the
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accounts of humor they give come from a
commitment to an Aristotelian foundation.
Robert Roberts is quite explicit about this in
his article “Humor and the Virtues.” In this piece,
Robert Roberts, like Richard Richards, begins by
adopting an incongruity account of humor. For both
Robert Roberts and Richard Richards, an act is
humorous only if it includes an incongruity that is at
least perceived by the person finding the act
humorous (more than perception may be required,
but the perception of the incongruity is at least a
necessary condition for an act to be an act of
humor).
Robert Roberts, like Richard Richards, is not
interested in humor theory for the sake of humor
theory, but hopes to find how we ought to think
about humor as embedded in the lived life.
The key to perceiving incongruities for the
sake of humor, according to Robert Roberts, is
“perspectivity.” When we see something as
incongruous, what we are often doing is seeing the
same thing from multiple perspectives. By seeing
the same thing through different interpretive lenses,
we can make sense of the same thing in different,
perhaps contrasting, ways.
This perspectivity, he argues, requires
dissociation, that is, (a) the ability for us to recognize
that there is a perspective other than our own to be
occupied, and (b) the ability to then occupy this
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alternative perspective. To develop a sense of
humor, that is, to be able to recognize humor, one
needs to always be aware that one is perceiving
through a perspective which is not the only possible
perspective.
He does not, however, contend that all is
mere perspective. He is committed to the existence
of an objective reality. So, we must not attribute to
Robert Roberts a perspectival perspectivalism, but
rather a more limited perspectivalism which he
terms “soft perspectivalism.” There is a real world,
he holds, but we experience it from one of many
possible angles.
Humor is to found in simultaneously
understanding: (1) the perception of the object of
the perception from our perspective, (2) that there is
another perspective from which the object of
perception may be perceived, (3) the perception of
the object of perception from the alternative
perspective, and (4) that there is an incongruity
between the two perceptions despite the fact that
they are perceptions of the same object being
perceived. Sometimes, but only sometimes, this
incongruity will be of the proper sort to be
humorous. A sense of humor is the ability to
distinguish the proper from the improper cases.
The question he ultimately seeks to answer
in setting this out is whether a sense of humor ought
to be considered a virtue, or at least something
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capable of enhancing one’s moral education which
he works out in terms of character development
which in turn is worked out in terms of virtues. This
is where the Aristotelianism is fully transparent.
This gets ramped up further with Robert
Roberts’ contention that each person possesses both
a character and a nature and that virtue is the state
of one’s character being brought into line with one’s
nature. To recognize that there is a gap between
one’s character and one’s nature is to see oneself in
two different ways as being two different things.
This is an incongruity and can, through proper
dissociation and perspectivity, allow one to laugh at
one’s own flaws and foibles. This, then, puts us in a
place of objective knowledge about what we need to
improve in ourselves and that is crucial to personal
growth. In Robert Roberts’ own words,
“The concept of a virtue implies the concept
of a human nature. To possess a virtue is to
be ‘qualified’ as having to that extent
realized one’s nature, as having become in
actuality what one inevitably was in
potentiality. The concept of a virtue is thus
the concept of a congruity between one’s
character and one’s nature, and thus of the
live possibility of lacking congruity between
character and nature – of falling short of
one’s telos. Given this, the form of humor
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closely connected with the virtues would be
a representation of moral failures as
incongruities. To perceive such
incongruities in oneself and others would
be a mark of moral knowledge, and the
disposition to perceive them could be
counted as an important part of wisdom. In
so far as wisdom is a virtue which pervades
the others – there being wisdom concerning
justice, wisdom concerning truth-telling,
wisdom about situations calling for courage,
etc. – the moral sense of humor would
perhaps apply, with differences, to the
whole range of virtues (Roberts, p. 130).”
We see in Robert Roberts’ writing that a sense of
humor may be an aid to becoming a more virtuous
person, in other words, an aid in our moral
education.
Let us now turn from Robert Roberts to
Richard Richards. Richard Richards, like Robert
Roberts, contends that we possess a character and,
like Aristotle, holds character to be comprised of
attitudes and proclivities that we develop through
our choices and our actions. Like Robert Roberts,
Richard Richards is committed to a real reality and
among that which may be considered objective is
humor. It is an objective fact of the world if
something is humorous and those with a developed
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sense of humor will be the accomplished judges that
we can turn to in order to see whether an act was, in
fact, humorous.
So, what is it to have a sense of humor
according to Richard? In his words,
“A sense of humor is an attitude or set of
attitudes that involve a tendency to notice,
explore, and sometimes create
incongruities, and to appreciate them in a
playful way that is usually pleasurable
(Richards, p. 72).”
A sense of humor is thus, first and foremost, an
attitude or set of attitudes. What is an attitude?
“An attitude is a habitual psychological
structure that influences and often controls
what we perceive, that is, what we think
and feel, and the beliefs we have about
those things we perceive and feel. Though
the term ‘attitude’ has, in common usage,
come to mean mostly a bad or hostile
attitude, I am using the term much more
generally. Roughly, an attitude is a set of
habits with which we approach life, and
many attitudes are learned early in life
(Richards, pp. 72-3).”
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As with Robert Roberts, we see with Richard
Richards, a firm commitment to a practical
Aristotelianism.
A sense of humor for Richard is thus an
attitude. It is an attitude which leads to the
appreciation of incongruities. Let us take the notion
of incongruity to be well-understood and welldefined (ignoring Robert Latta’s objections here).
The question remaining is therefore, “What is it to
appreciate an incongruity?” Richard answers,
“The act of appreciating involves
recognizing the worth of something. It
involves the discovery or creation of value.
You have to have some sort of knowledge in
order to appreciate something. That also
distinguishes it from simple cases of liking.
You can like something without recognizing
its worth or value. You can value something
without liking it. The recognition of value or
worth involves the possession of some kind
of knowledge other than that involved in
liking (Richards, p. 76).”
Appreciating something, an incongruity or
otherwise, involves specialized knowledge which
some may possess and others not. In this way, we
see John Stuart Mill’s famous passage from
Utilitarianism being obliquely referred to in which
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there are some who have developed a proclivity that
makes them superior judges of value. “It is better to
be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different
opinion, it is only because they only know their own
side of the question. (Mill, p. 10).” In the same way,
if a person with a developed sense of humor finds
something funny and someone else does not, the
person without the developed sense of humor is
wrong about the objective fact of the humorousness
of the object.
The sense of humor as Richard Richards sets
it out does not require an objective human nature.
It is a desirable development in the character of a
person, but not a failure of character the way Robert
Roberts would have. As such, what we see in
Richard Richards’ conception of the human and the
sense of humor is something akin to Kant’s notion of
an imperfect duty. It is a good to develop it, but not
something morally necessary.
But its development is not direct.
According to Richard, the development of a sense of
humor requires first that one develop a sense of the
funny.
“The sense of the funny is a skill at
determining where a person is likely to find
the amusing, rather than simply waiting for
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something to happen which causes laughs.
It also includes a habitual understanding of
when it is appropriate to laugh and when it
is not (Richards, p. 77).”
As a child, one develops a sense of the funny, but
then as an adult one may go farther and develop a
full-fledged sense of humor.
“When does the sense of the funny become
the sense of humor? It varies in individual
cases. We hone the ability to laugh at the
proper times. From this proceeds the
ability to appreciate the incongruities of life.
It takes more learning for a person to have
a sense of humor than to learn to laugh
when others laugh, to laugh when someone
says something that is called ‘funny’ and we
feel obliged to laugh (Richards, p. 78).”
So, where Robert Roberts gives us an account of the
sense of humor that comes not only from a
commitment to a virtue ethics, but also a
commitment to the underlying metaphysical picture
of the human being, we can say that Robert Roberts
has an Aristotelian Aristotelianism. Richard
Richards, unlike Robert Roberts, does not have an
Aristotelian Aristotelianism. Richard Richards’
Aristotelianism is more intricate. He invokes the sort

79

of levels of knowledge being morally relevant that
we find in Mill. He makes the sense of humor a
desirable property along the lines of the imperfect
duties of Kant. And he makes the development of it
a stepwise evolutionary process of the sort we find
in Hegel. Therefore, we can say that Richard has a
Kantian Hegelian Millian Aristotelianism.
I love the phrase “Kantian Hegelian Millian
Aristotelianism” because it might be a convoluted
way of saying something straightforward which
would make it quite Kantian. It might be a
convoluted way of saying absolutely nothing, which
would make it quite Hegelian. Or it might just lead
one to have a nervous breakdown which would
make it quite Millian.
I will mention the title of one of my favorite
papers in the philosophy of language at this point by
Nathan Salmon. His goal in this article is to revive
John Stuart Mill’s approach to language and is titled,
“How to be a Millian Heir.” I do not bring this up
because it has any relevance at all to the points I am
making here, but rather because this is my paper
and I will talk about whatever the fuck I want.
So, we have with Robert Roberts and
Richard Richards, two contrasting Aristotelian
accounts of the sense of humor. Robert Roberts is
an Aristotelian Aristotelian where Richard Richards is
not an Aristotelian Aristotelian, but rather a Kantian
Hegelian Millian Aristotelian.
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Which of the two ought we prefer? To
weigh the two alternatives with an eye toward
seeing which is stronger, I propose we look to
Richard Richards. Not Richard Richards – that would
be to engage in circular reasoning precisely because
the reasoning would be circular. Rather, Richard
Richards, by which I mean not Richard C. Richards,
the beloved member of the Lighthearted
Philosophers Society and emeritus philosopher of
aesthetics, ethics, and love and sex from Cal Poly,
Pomona, but rather Richard A. Richards, professor of
philosophy with a focus on the philosophy of biology
at the University of Alabama. (That’s the University
of Alabama not in Birmingham, but in Tuscaloosa,
real Alabama – Richard Richards from Alabama
Alabama). Richard A. Richards toured the world as a
professional, classical dancer before he became a
professional philosopher, completing his graduate
work at Johns Hopkins where we took graduate
seminars in philosophy of science together. I pride
myself on perhaps being the only person who is
friends with both Richard Richardses.
As one would expect from an expert on
evolutionary explanation, Richard Richards gives an
account of aesthetic judgment which is modeled
upon the Darwinian concept of fitness. Evolutionary
fitness, Richards argues, is a three-place relationship
among the property, the organism, and the context
in which the organism finds itself. It is the
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contextual piece that is essential here. No property
is itself good for an organism in general, but only
good in terms of its context. That context may be
internal – that is, advantageous in terms of the
relations of the parts of the organisms – or external
– that is, advantageous in relation to some
environmental factor. But whether it is an internal
or external context, we have to see fitness as a
function of its functional context. Fitness for Richard
Richards is a function of function.
Richard Richards’ own fitness, for example,
has been significantly aided by the contextual factor
of his avoiding gluten. He told me he dropped
fifteen pounds. Dude looked good last time I was
down in Alabama.
Just as with evolutionary fitness, so too with
artistic fitness. We have to see fitness as a threeplace relation connecting a property of the work
(e.g., unity, complexity, or intensity), the work as a
whole, and the context of the work. Again, the
functional context may be internal – that is, a
function of the property understood fully within the
work itself, such as color relationships, composition,
or form – or it may be external – that is, an aspect of
the social, historical, or political context in which the
artistic work is appreciated.
As a philosopher with a strong biological
background, he points out that a number of the
properties we judge positively in works of art are
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direct results of our cognitive structure which
directly results from our brains being the product of
evolutionary processes. The human brain, for
example, is outstanding at edge detection because
we naturally engage in lateral inhibition wherein the
brain naturally exaggerates the contrast in light
values when darker and lighter areas are juxtaposed.
This is why we will naturally project boundaries and
edges onto pieces like pointillist works in which none
exist.
As such, our appreciation of art – and we
can argue by extension, humor – is a function of our
function as humans. This is very much in line with
the sort of Aristotelian Aristotelianism of Robert
Roberts as it posits universal human properties
which we can see as the sort of human nature
Roberts requires.
But Richard Richards also contends that the
external context is crucial to understanding our
understanding of art. We acquire categories
through education and the more educated one is,
the better one is as a judge of artistic quality.
“The experience of an artwork will
therefore vary depending on which features
we believe to be standard, variable, and
contra-standard, and that depends on
experience and learning. Consequently,
functional context – and functioning – will
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vary depending on the presence of this kind
of knowledge in those who experience the
work (Richards, p. 267).”
Further, the acquired knowledge affects how we
perceive, not just how we interpret what we
perceive.
“Education can affect the experience of an
artwork in other ways. Experiments have
shown that formal training influences visual
scan paths in the scrutiny of the artwork
(ibid.).”
If we take humor to be an artistic category, then this
approach is precisely in line with the sort of Kantian
Hegelian Millian Aristotelianism espoused by Richard
Richards.
So, while Richard Richards may be seen at
first to side with Robert Roberts against Richard
Richards, in the end it does seem that Richard
Richards supports Richard Richards over Robert
Roberts. But he does not fully locate himself on
either extreme, instead contending that the correct
answer is to be found in the mean between two
extremes. So, while Richard Richards may not
espouse an Aristotelian Aristotelianism; Richard
Richards, on the other hand, can be thought of as
adopting an Aristotelian Aristotelian Aristotelianism.
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But Richard Richards’ Aristotelian Aristotelian
Aristotelianism does not support Robert Roberts’
Aristotelian Aristotelianism, rather Richard Richards’
Aristotelian Aristotelian Aristotelianism supports
Richard Richards’ Kantian Hegelian Millian
Aristotelianism. So, we must conclude that in this
case, we should agree with Richard. That is, Richard,
not Richard. But we agree with Richard because
Richard agrees with Richard.
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Richard Richards is a Gay Scientist
Dave Monroe
A little recognized and under-appreciated
fact about the august Richard Richards is that he is a
gay scientist. I know what you may be thinking—
Richard’s never shagged dudes, and if he has, it’s
shitty to out him in an essay that’s meant to honor
him. That’s strictly his business. Or you may be
thinking that that Richard identifies as a philosopher,
not a physicist, biologist, or even (egads!) a
psychologist. As far as I know, you would be right in
both cases—and it would be terrible to call him out-despite the fact that this will hardly rise to the level
of an essay.
No, what I mean is that Richard Richards
practices the sort of approach to philosophy that
Nietzsche prescribes in The Gay Science. Now, I
won’t pretend to know fuckall about Nietzsche—but
that’s okay because there are roughly 7,500 budding
philosophy majors lurking in coffee shops, craft
breweries, and organic grocery stores around the
country who’ve got him figured out and would be
delighted to expound on my ignorance. If you are
genuinely curious about whether I’ve got Nietzsche
right, ask one of them. Or read some Nietzsche. In
any case, I’m not entirely convinced that getting
philosophers “right” is the point; rather, good
philosophers plunder brilliant ideas from better
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philosophers or scientists, looting those concepts for
their own ends–just ask Schopenhauer—and I think
Richard might agree with this (c.f., his devotion to
Provine and incongruity theory).
But let me try to clarify my meaning. The
very title of Nietzsche’s work, The Gay Science, as
well as many of the passages contained therein (no
bloody citations forthcoming) suggests that
systematic inquiry (wissenschaft: obligatory use of a
foreign word to give gravity to this paper) into very
serious subjects can be approached with a
lighthearted spirit of joy. It is in this sense that I
mean Richard is a gay scientist.
It goes without saying that most
philosophers take themselves, and their work, far
too seriously. It’s understandable, of course. Most
of us spend so much time steeped not only in our
particular areas of study but also fighting for tenure,
or struggling to demonstrate the legitimacy of our
field, that we lose sight of our own provincialism. It
might be worth remembering that the average
person would literally consider these debates the
raving of lunatics. Richard cannot be counted
among those who’ve lost this perspective. There’s
nothing he won’t laugh at, including his own demise.
As we all know, he’s committed to putting the ‘fun’
back in ‘funeral.’ Won’t that be a sight? Let’s hope
that day isn’t soon.
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Richard is funny. There’s no doubt about
that. He’s especially deft with “dad jokes,” which I
suppose is appropriate, and, given his age, we might
rename them “great-great-great-great-great-greatgrand dad jokes” in his honor. Richard actually took
lectures from Nietzsche at the University of Basel.
It’s a little known fact that Nietzsche resigned in
1879 due to Richard’s being a thorn in his side.
There’s also no doubt that Richard is a very good
philosopher—all jokes aside—and, most importantly,
that Richard not only philosophizes about humor,
but integrates humor in his philosophy. His work is
both risible and rigorous simultaneously. With all
due respect to other funny philosophers, it is my
considered judgment that no one strikes the balance
so perfectly. He is a living rejoinder to Joseph Ellin’s
claim (in the very first paper read at the Lighthearted
Philosophers’ Society) that philosophy cannot be
funny. Richard shows us that Old Joe is dead wrong.
And just dead, for that matter, though we miss him
dearly.
I would be remiss if I didn’t recount
Richard’s heroic courage and willingness to tackle
tough issues head on, too. That’s a pretty
Nietzschean quality, I think. In the spring of 2013, I
invited Richard and Steve “The Checksecutioner”
Gimbel (so named because he rakes in cash with his
side gigs) to give the Annual Keith Goree Memorial
Ethics Lecture at St. Petersburg College. The Goree
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Lecture honors one of my former colleagues, who,
incidentally, was a charter member and early
financial supporter of the Lighthearted Philosophers’
Society. Two founding members dead already?
Damn. Richard’s probably next.
Anyway, the lecture is a showcase event for
my department and the college; we typically shell
out big bucks for relatively famous people with
moderately interesting things to say about boring
contemporary social issues. I was able to throw
Richard and Steve a couple of ducats and pay for
them to visit Florida, so, essentially, I misused public
funds so I could hang out with friends. Let’s recall,
after all, that was the initial mission of the LPS. They
agreed to talk about the ethics of humor, which I
thought fitting because Keith was a wonderfully
funny guy.
There was a palpable excitement in the air
on the night of the lecture. Students and a spectrum
of people from the community filled one of our
auditoriums to capacity, eager to learn about the
ethical limits of joking from two sagacious masters.
Gimbel opened with a standup routine meant to
offer food for thought—and, I must say, he killed.
Almost everyone laughed and enjoyed the entire
“lecture” (it ended up mostly consisting of Steve and
Richard telling jokes) until the hard questions about
racist, sexist, and religiously insensitive jokes came
up. One should note that the crowd was very
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diverse; there were as many Black and Latino
attendees as White. Richard, undaunted by the
stigmas around those subjects, gave a rousing
oration on disempowering hate speech by losing our
fear of using racially insensitive words. He showed
that he wasn’t afraid by chanting the ‘n-word’ to the
crowd, who looked on with expressions that were
equal parts horror, amusement, and fury. It was a
little like watching a 90-year-old white man dropping
N-Bombs in public. Actually, it was exactly like
watching that. The audience began to thin, but
Richard was undeterred. “N-word,” “N-word,” “Nword,” he continued. Notice that I’m not nearly as
courageous as Richard because I can’t even bring
myself to write the n-word.
The confused audience began leaving in
droves and I started to fear for my job. Richard
continued. The tension mounted. Soon, groups of
angry students stormed the stage, crying out for
Richard’s head. Gimbel and I were forced to defend
him, fending off the mobs by threatening to drop
stage lights on them and beating them with
microphone stands. Richard was so courageous that
he did not stop the lecture until we were showered
in gore.
Some of that story is actually true. Ask Steve or
Richard—or any of the administrators at SPC who
called me on the carpet. Incredibly, my dean still
asks me to find the Goree Lecture speakers. And,
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believe it or not, I’d enthusiastically, joyfully, have
Richard come back. Again, and again, and again. And
again. And again.
C’mon now! As everyone reading this
essay—and all the kids in the brew pubs, coffee
shops and groceries--know, The Gay Science
(Section…uh…) is the one of the earliest
deployments of the eternal return of the same. I
wouldn’t be doing my solemn philosophical duty if I
didn’t make a shitty joke referring to it.
In all seriousness, Richard, I love you and am pleased
to call you a friend and inspiration. You are an
innovator of a new spirit of doing philosophy—a
Zarathustra—and are the soul of the Lighthearted
Philosophers society. Thank you for showing us the
way, you gay scientist.
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The Legend of the Altweiß
Liz Sills
Once upon a time there was an Old White
Man. He was very funny, but not in a “haha” kind of
way. He was funny mostly in a non-threatening
whimsical kind of way. Everywhere he went, people
laughed merrily. He would make horrible puns and
people would laugh. He would pause dramatically
before saying something innocuous and people
would laugh. He would make racist quips using
words for Italian people that haven’t been popular
since the 1920s and people would laugh.
One day, on a cobblestone path that cut
across a verdant meadow, the Old White Man came
across an eighty-year-old girl wearing a fauxhawk
and no innocence whatsoever. “Old White Man,”
she asked, gazing up into his cataract-clouded eyes,
“Why does everyone laugh merrily in your presence
no matter what you do? When I say the same things
people get offended or start mansplaining the world
to me.”
The Old White Man thought and thought.
He was very perplexed at the question, and also
because the little girl had been talking to him for
more than thirty seconds and had not laughed
merrily. He must have an answer, he decided.
Quickly (as quickly as he could, anyway) he made his
way to the nearest university library and found an
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august tome written by a venerated scholar with a
repetitive name and decorated with an etching of a
lemur whose sage eyes held the promise of resolving
his quandary.
Ravenously the Old White Man searched for
explanations. He read that some people laugh
merrily because they feel superior to other people or
ideas. This could not be true, he decided, because if
it were then people would laugh more merrily at the
little girl and her radical haircut than they did at him.
The tome then informed him that people laugh
merrily when they resolve incongruities. This was
also not true, he decided, because Old White Men
always automatically make sense. Relief Theory?
Although he did understand that some people might
be intimidated by his vast knowledge of How the
World Works, he did not think that anything about
him would relieve anyone of that impression. Humor
and the aesthetic? Well, he wasn’t bad to look at, he
had to admit, but he didn’t think his visage was
guffaw-worthy.
Again as quickly as he could the Old White
Man returned to the verdant meadow and found the
little girl standing, arms crossed and legs akimbo, in
the middle of the cobblestone path.
“Little girl,” croaked the Old White Man, “I am funny
simply because I am funny. There is no need for
inquiry into the matter. I am, in a manner of
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speaking, always funny because that’s always just
the way it is.”
The little girl scowled and the Old White
Man was suddenly very disturbed that there should
be a little girl in the world who was not smiling. He
tried making faces, but she did not laugh merrily.
Nor did she laugh merrily when he rubbed her
affectionately on the head and made the most
obvious puns he could think of. He even attempted a
winning anecdote featuring Christian religious
figures, overbearing wives, and a convenience store
clerk with an Indian accent, but the little girl simply
glared at him.
Finally, in exasperation, the Old White Man
demanded of the little girl: “Why are you so curious
about the things I do, anyway? Why don’t you toddle
off to pick daisies and poppies in the verdant
meadow. Anyway, I’ll bet that if you wanted to try to
be funny you could just talk about, you know,
woman things. Like boobs. Boobs are hilarious.”
The little girl contemplated the Old White
Man seriously for a few moments. Finally, she
exclaimed: “Because you’re in my way!”
And with that, the little girl kicked the Old
White Man in the kneecap and trotted around him
down the cobblestone path out of verdant meadow.
In the nearest village the simple peasant folk felt the
tranquil rustle of a pastoral breeze and for no
apparent reason found themselves laughing merrily.
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A Philosopher with a Sense of Humor
Eugene Zaldivar
In this very short acknowledgment I think
I’d like to accomplish two things. First, I’d like to give
a sense of the affect that having seen Richard in
action has had on me. Second, I’d like to point to an
important development in philosophy of humor
contributed by Richards in his work “A Philosopher
Looks at the Sense of Humor” which I believe needs
to be central to the philosophical discussion of
humor and joking going forward.
To begin with Richard C. Richards, a name
so great it earns the full allotment of its letters, is, I
think, an example of what we should all aspire to as
philosophers. I believe that we are all aware of the
many noxious tropes in our field. For one there
seems to be a sense that there must be an element
of suffering in any graduate program that is worth a
damn. That, in order to earn a PhD, you must be torn
down and shredded. I never had the privilege of
studying with Richard, but I cannot help but believe
that he would have nothing to do with this way of
doing things.
There is a second stereotype very common
in analytic philosophy: the philosopher who believes
that the only worthwhile response to a talk is to
make the speaker regret having said anything at all.
The philosopher who believes that a barely civil take-
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down which displays the commenter’s genius, for
the mere pittance of humiliating the speaker, is the
raison d’etra of attending a conference. That toxic,
hostility is too often displayed at conferences and
even putatively friendly department colloquia. I have
never seen it in Richard. Indeed, I have seen the
opposite.
Richard invariably has kind things to say
every time he offers any sort of comment. He is the
epitome of the sort of philosopher we should all
strive to be. He endeavors to support and enable his
interlocutors. He is not interested in showing off
how smart he is, but rather in helping everyone get a
better sense of the idea being discussed. Of course,
this does nothing to obscure just how smart he is.
Even when he is indeed pointing to a significant
problem, he understands that you don’t have to
demean a person’s efforts when offering a critique.
It took me many years of attending LPS
conferences alongside Richard (and the rest of the
regulars) to see that this is a better way to do things.
To see that philosophers can contribute to a field
without indulging our destructive tendencies. I am
grateful to him, and the LPS, for that lesson. I hope
to live up to it.
I have had the privilege to comment on
Richard’s work twice during our time at LPS. I was
also allowed to work as his oracle; I read Richard’s
comments on Steve Gimbel’s book at the 11th
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meeting of the LPS in 2017. That was the smartest
I’ve ever sounded.
In working with Richard over the years it’s
hard to miss one of his central concerns: getting
clear about just what the sense of humor is and what
it is not. Humor as he has argued at different times is
distinct from joking, laughter and cleverness. It is
both an attitude and an intellectual exercise. It
makes our liver better and it helps us to understand
our world. More precisely, he defines it as the
playful appreciation of incongruity. It seems to me
that this is a good analysis. His arguments have won
me over.
In a recent conference I suggested, halfjokingly, that we ought to have comedy appreciation
courses just as we have courses in film, art and
music appreciation. I am moved, more and more to
take this as a serious goal. If we do develop these
courses the curriculum will be incomplete without
Richards.

97

Putting the ‘Fun’ Back in ‘Funeral’
Tom Brommage
The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius writes
in his notebooks: “You are a little soul carrying a
corpse,” quoting the Greek stoic philosopher
Epictetus. As he was likely writing these notes to
himself as a form of mental discipline in the throes of
a military campaign, he obviously meant that
observation to be comforting. To most it is far from
that, of course—but the reason why this is so is
worthy of some attention.
For Marcus, the reality of death was
manifest on the battlefield. The purpose of this stoic
sense of detachment from events which we can’t
control becomes apparent in times like these: to
remove the anxiety associated with one’s own
unavoidable demise. But to many in contemporary
American society—filling their emptiness with
consumer commodities and HOA regulations—they
don’t like being reminded of death. That sense of
morbidity—or (as I will suggest, a sense of honesty
about death) is poor manners. The sense of ‘fleeing’
from death into the overwhelming variety of ‘prefab’ identities is a banality amongst the existentialist
philosophers. But regardless: both perspectives
occupy on an opposite place in distinction between
what I might call a ‘common-sense attitude’ and a
‘philosophical attitude’ towards death.
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By the ‘philosophical attitude,’ I mean
nothing more than: being unafraid to think about
uncomfortable topics. We can sum it up under
William James’ reflection on philosophy, that it “sees
the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as
if it were familiar.” Reflections on death—
characteristic of a sense of depression and anxiety—
is one of the more uncomfortable and strange
realities there is (those being capable of reflecting on
it never having experienced it, of course—); the
purpose of the philosophical attitude therefore is to
make it familiar. As Plato tells us in The Phaedo,
philosophers are always preparing for death.
Of course: there are other types of outlooks
towards death. A ‘scientific outlook,’ for example—
understanding it as a cessation of metabolic
processes—does have the same tendency to nullify
the anxiety regarding the 'end of the tour.' Through
this lens, by reductionist fantasy, we can safely dodge
the reality by obfuscating it in polysyllabic jargon.
The scientific attitude towards death, while it fills the
same role as the philosophical attitude, has the side
effect of reducing death to the ontic and not the
ontological, as Heidegger puts it. Death is more than
one’s corporeal existence as a corpse—it’s always
“one’s own.”
The first time I met Richard about a decade
ago, he was wearing a T-Shirt for his own funeral.
“Putting the ‘fun’ back in funeral” it said,
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emblazoned across the front. You see: several years
prior Richard had held his own funeral. When
queried on the oddity, he responded dryly: “Well,
one never gets to enjoy it . . .” The simple truth of
that reason was unavoidable.
This is often the first story I tell people
about him, for two reasons. First, I just think it’s
cool. One’s mind immediately turns to Twain’s Tom
Sawyer, hiding in the church rafters, listening to the
wails of those below at his own funeral. But unlike
Sawyer, Richard’s intent was not cloaked in deceitful
or malicious intent. It was rooted in a more
fundamental honesty about one’s demise.
But secondly, I also tell this story because I
think it captures something important about having
a sense of humor about death. While there are
perhaps many different perspectives towards death
that one might hold which might be called
‘philosophical’ in the sense I mean above—humor is
one of those genuinely philosophical attitudes
towards it. Dark and morbid humor has the effect of
'taming' the inevitable. And it is for this reason that
it is truly needed: to knock one out of the malaise of
denial. It allows us to be honest about our own
finitude, instead of denying its looming, icy grip.
For this reason, I totally intend to rip off
that joke and hold my own funeral. But I'm
admitting it, because I follow Richard's example with
his honesty, if not his creativity.
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Objectively Funny Jokes:
Comedy’s El Dorado or a Simple MacGuffin?
Mike Cundall
Could there ever be an objectively funny
joke or bit of humor? With the popularity of certain
forms of humor, with the appearance of puns as
consistent stages in the development of humor in
children, this seems a reasonable query. Further,
give recent developments in humor theory, and
depending on what stance you take on what is
essential to the funny or humorous your answer
could be yes or no.
Historically, given the prevailing theories of humor
to date, the answer would have been a resounding
‘no’. Whether you were a Hobbesian leviathan
superior to all, or a Freudian fellow with your mental
plumbing bound up like your mother’s panties
(apologies for mixing my metaphors), or a callous
incongruitest, the answer has to be nopety-nope.
The unifying thread through these disparate
theories, and others in the incongruity family, of
which our esteemed Richard C. Richards is an elder
statesman, who certainly won’t find this essay a
worthy honor, is that humor is a consumer-sided
event—a demand side theory. Humor is in the mind
of the experiencer. If it turns out that arrangement
of elements on the side of a building looked like a
funny face, then it was funny. The very fact that
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there is a needed cognitive appreciation by the
receiver of the joke in order for humor to occur,
settles the case. To imagine a universal joke that
would elicit mirth from an individual is to tilt at
windmills. It’s, in the immortal words of Vizzini,
“inconceivable.” What one might find incongruous,
or illustrative of superiority, or redirects my mental
or neural plumbing to release laughter and humor, is
specific to the individual. Cultures, individual
histories are all too vast, too varied, dare I say, to
incongruous, to expect that there be a joke pulled
from the bowels of the comedy club that bestows
upon the teller, like Excalibur to Artie, a guaranteed
laugh.
But there are new players on the field and
we shan’t be bound to the mistaken theories of our
forebears no matter how august the thinker (looking
at you, Richards). So, let us give heed to a new brand
of humor theory—a demand side approach. An
approach that favors the would be joke creator, as
opposed to the plebian audience. One, if accurate,
would offer up an answer to our leading question in
the positive. One that would not only tilt at the
windmills, but actually knock ‘em down. One that
finds the fountain of youth, and lays claim to the
comic grail of the universally funny joke: an answer
that would pierce the incongruous heart of darkness
and bring forth the heart of gold. And what upstart
could propose such a radical turning of the humor
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theories on their respective ears? Why none other
than our own Steven Gimbel. A man whose august
status is rivaled only by the length of his hair.
Exorbitant as Gimbel’s recent book, Isn’t
that Clever? is, (he does claim to find El Dorado, so
maybe it’s worth the gold) is a healthy and needed
look at humor theorizing that incorporates
philosophy of science (Hempel is grinning right now,
though the irony is lost on Popper) and a careful
attention to those who craft jokes (Gimbel is a
studied and practiced comedian). Gimbel’s novel
addition to humor theory is his focus on a
shortcoming in the dominant theory of humor, the
incongruity theory and his alternate theory of
humor. Gimbel explores the worry that incongruity
becomes a vacuous term or one that is drawn out so
broadly as to be trivially true. It is what it is after all.
Gimbel then presents an alternative theory that
wants to focus not on the perception of humor, but
on the object of humor itself. Instead of relying on
some audience dullard to note the incongruity
presented to them, Gimbel argues that humor is “An
act is humorous if and only if it is an intentional,
conspicuous act of playful cleverness.” (Gimbel,
2017) This theory is of great relief to all failed comics
out there (perhaps Gimbel is sublimating his rage?).
For me, I now realize that I am damn humorous and
my wife and all those students who heretofore have
not “gotten” my jokes in class, well phooey on them.
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Much of the power and support to be found
for Gimbel’s approach comes from the attention he
pays to how people discuss humor. He cleverly notes
that many people recognize humor as such even
when they do not find the humor on offer mirthful.
To Gimbel’s mind, and rightly so it seems, this is a
tacit recognition that while one didn’t find it funny, it
still is humor, and hence humor is not simply a
demand side event. To recognize something as
humor, but a failed attempt, already shows that
humor is not simply reliant on a chortle or guffaw to
be real humor. And while laughs may pay the bills,
humor is more indigent, or perhaps indignant.
Apparently, I have been making jokes for a very long
time.
It’s worth exploring more what Gimbel
notes about our language when we discuss humor.
In the semi-rhetorical query “You’re joking right!?”
one sees a glimmer of what humor really is. Gimbel
notes that either way one answers supports his view
that humor is a supply side phenomenon. If you
respond in the negative, then it isn’t a joke, my mirth
or laugh were it present is inappropriately placed. If I
answer in the affirmative, then the laughter is
proper. Were it the case that humor was truly
subjective, then the answer given by the
interrogated wouldn’t matter. My laughter or lack
thereof would be proper only insofar as I found it
funny or not. Come to think of it, this would make
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current White House press briefings a whole lot
easier. But to return to Gimbel’s point, the fact that
it is perfectly sensible to discuss and assign a proper
or improper response based on whether the
utterance was taken as a joke or not, indicates that
there is a whole lot more than simple subjectivity in
humor. Humor is more than the cognitive
achievement of the perceiver. There is an important
and totally ignored part of the attempt at humor. A
thing agreed upon, but sometimes failed to achieve.
Kudos to Gimbel for this work.
Now we’re running short of time and space
for a Feschriften sort of article; well at least an LPS
Feschriften. But, if as Gimbel notes, the study of
humor is really now working as a mature science and
is really into the puzzle solving phase, what we have
here is a genuine puzzle. Humor is either a supply
side, objective sort of phenomenon, or it’s a demand
side, subjective phenomenon? I think there is some
philosophical legerdemain in the way that Gimbel
casts incongruity theorists as subjectivists, though I
cannot for the moment clearly define why. But the
truth is, his points about the recognition of failed
humor are strong, which strongly indicates that
there is something of great importance in the
attempt to be funny.
What I will suggest, in a hand-waivy, I-can’tbe-held-responsible-for-clearly-saying-why-at-themoment sort of way, is that our discussions of
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humor may be enriched if we approach humor as a
success term. The best possible exemplar,
paradigmatic humor if you will (damn you Tom
Kuhn), would be a case where someone intends to
be funny, using cleverness, and that the audience
does indeed find the act to be humorous. If we set
this as the best of all possible humor, then we can
preserve elements of the incongruity theory worth
preserving, as well an bring aboard Gimbel’s insight.
The upshot of this is that this approach is supported
by some of what is taken as a good characteristic of
scientific theorizing, broad range. A theory that
brings under one tent the supply side and the
demand side covers more of the phenomena of
humor. And this is a step in the right direction. Our
honoree would surely applaud the maintenance of
the need for incongruity, and our man responsible
for the honors will be pleased. It also has the benefit
of widening the scope of our research and
maintaining some of our intuitions on what humor
is. And if science has ever liked anything, it certainly
has to be explanations that cover more. Am I right?
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